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INTRODUCTION
HE President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certifi-
cates, and the Votes shall then be counted.”1
* Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. 
** J.D. expected, Yale University, 2005; D.Phil. expected, Oxford University, 2004. 
The authors wish to thank Joyce Appleby, Larry Kramer, and Jack Rakove for their 
thoughtful remarks.
1 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
“T 
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We last glimpsed the dangers lurking in these lines during the 
electoral crisis of 2000. As sitting Vice-President, Al Gore was the 
President of the Senate on January 6, 2001. So it fell to him to 
“open all the Certificates” and preside over the vote count. 
What if there had still been a dispute over the electoral votes 
from Florida? Consider the following scenario: After much Sturm 
und Drang, the Florida courts decide that Gore is the winner, but 
the Florida legislature grants the state’s twenty-five electoral votes 
to George W. Bush. These rival authorities transmit competing 
electoral college certificates to Washington D.C., ready to be 
opened when the moment of truth arrives. Pursuant to constitu-
tional command, the Vice-President “open[s] all the Certificates.” 
What happens next? 
The constitutional text does not speak clearly. It authorizes the 
Vice-President to “open” the certificates but leaves the extent of 
his further powers hidden in the passive voice: “and the Votes shall 
then be counted.” 
These textual penumbras can be enlightened by precedents that 
have gone largely unnoticed for two centuries: the electoral vote 
disputes of 1796 and 1800. On these two occasions, John Adams 
and Thomas Jefferson found themselves in Al Gore’s position. As 
Vice-Presidents in the preceding administration, they were presid-
ing over a vote count in which they were leading candidates, and in 
both instances, they used their power to make rulings that favored 
their own election as President of the United States. This Article 
will present the first in-depth treatment of these precedents,2 em-
phasizing the dramatic moment when Thomas Jefferson made a 
questionable ruling that enhanced his chances of becoming the 
next President of the United States, rather than John Adams or 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. 
Adams’s decisions in 1797 were perfectly sensible but frame an 
analysis of Jefferson’s problematic conduct the next time around. 
Vermont had cast four electoral votes for Adams and his running 
mate Thomas Pinckney, but the legality of the state’s action had 
been publicly impugned and privately questioned by newspapers 
and politicians from both political parties. 
2 See infra note 5. 
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When Adams opened the formal certificates from Vermont they 
seemed completely regular, containing no hint of legal deficiency. 
Despite their facial perfection, Adams provided members of Con-
gress a formal opportunity to challenge Vermont’s four electoral 
votes before announcing that he had won the election by three 
votes over Jefferson. He declared himself President only after the 
Republicans remained silent. 
Thomas Jefferson was remarkably aggressive as President of the 
Senate. Georgia’s certificate—granting four electoral votes to Jef-
ferson and four electoral votes to Aaron Burr—was constitution-
ally defective on its face, a deficiency that was announced on the 
floor of Congress and reported by leading newspapers of the day.3
To resolve all doubts, we have located Georgia’s certificate in the 
National Archives, and it does indeed reveal striking constitutional 
irregularities. Nevertheless, and in contrast to Adams, Jefferson 
failed to pause before counting Georgia’s four electoral votes into 
the Republican column, declaring the final vote as if nothing were 
amiss. 
This ruling had serious consequences. With the Georgia votes 
included, the official tally was Jefferson seventy-three, Burr sev-
enty-three, Adams sixty-five, Charles C. Pinckney sixty-four, and 
John Jay one. To resolve this tie, the two leading candidates went 
to their famous runoff in the House, which was only resolved in 
Jefferson’s favor on the thirty-sixth ballot. 
Had Georgia’s ballot been excluded, the vote count for Jefferson 
and for Burr sinks to sixty-nine each, and this would have made a 
big difference under the electoral ground rules framed in Philadel-
phia. As we will explain,4 these rules would have admitted all five 
candidates into a runoff in the House. Including Adams, Pinckney, 
and Jay in the runoff would have dealt a serious blow to Jefferson’s 
prospects. The Federalists would no longer have been stuck with 
Aaron Burr as the only alternative to their archenemy Jefferson. 
They could have rallied around a much more attractive “compro-
mise” candidate: Charles Pinckney of South Carolina. Without the 
3 For further discussion of these matters, see infra notes 52–56 and accompanying 
text. 
4 See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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decisive use of his power as President of the Senate, Jefferson 
might never have become President of the United States.
This point was appreciated by contemporaries, but has dropped 
out of modern constitutional consciousness.5 After bringing this 
forgotten precedent into public view, we will consider its potential 
relevance for future Electoral College crises, using a variation on 
Bush v. Gore6 as an analytic platform. 
I. ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS
This Part sets the stage for Jefferson’s moment of truth as Presi-
dent of the Senate in 1801. Why did the Framers choose the sitting 
Vice-President to preside over the vote count in the first place? 
What were the rules, and animating ideals, of the Electoral College 
prior to enactment of the Twelfth Amendment? 
A. Founding Blunders 
The vice-presidency gave the Framers a lot of problems. They 
believed that a backstop was needed for the President, but they 
5 The Vermont problem is mentioned in passing in a variety of sources. J. Hampden 
Dougherty, The Electoral System of the United States 33–34 (1906); 2 John J. Lalor, 
Cyclopedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the 
United States 63, 68 (New York, Charles E. Merrill 1893); David A. McKnight, The 
Electoral System of the United States 65, 260, 290 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippcott & Co. 
1878); 1 Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897, at 51–52 
(Charles Knowles Bolton ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1975) (1898); 16 The Papers of 
James Madison 152, 429 n.2 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Madison Pa-
pers]; 2 The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison 1776–1826, at 959 n.23 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter 
Smith]; C.C. Tansill, Congressional Control of the Electoral System, 34 Yale L.J. 511, 
516 (1925); L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 Dick. L. 
Rev. 321, 326 n.23 (1961). Professor Manning Dauer is the only scholar to explore the 
incident in some depth, scrutinizing some, but not all, of the reports about the Ver-
mont issue. See Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists 103–06 (1953). 
 Jefferson’s decision in 1800 has received even less attention, even though the legal 
problems were more acute and the stakes were much higher. There are only a few 
mentions of the Georgia incident. See House Spec. Comm., Counting Electoral 
Votes, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 44-13, at 30 (1877) [hereinafter Counting Electoral 
Votes]; Dougherty, supra, at 35–36; Wroth, supra, at 326 n.23. These various sources 
largely cite one another. Vasan Kesavan mentions the issue more recently, citing to 
the preceding sources as well as to Professor Ackerman’s unpublished manuscript, 
America on the Brink. Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 
80 N.C. L. Rev. 1653, 1656 n.3, 1707 & n.230 (2002). 
6 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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were hard-put to figure out what to do with him while the Presi-
dent was alive.7 For want of anything better, they assigned him the 
largely ceremonial office of President of the Senate. 
But, alas, this office was not entirely ceremonial, and the Fram-
ers simply did not think through the full ramifications of this point. 
They recognized that the Senate would generate tie votes from 
time to time, and expressly granted the President of the Senate a 
tie-breaking vote.8 They failed, however, to consider other mo-
ments when the Vice-President might wield real power. 
Their most obvious blunder involves impeachment proceedings. 
The Founders recognized the absurdity of allowing the Vice-
President to preside over the Senate when the President was on 
trial for “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”9 He was inevitably an 
interested party in this affair, rising to the presidency if the incum-
bent were convicted. Given his personal stake in the matter, it was 
inappropriate for him to preside over the trial as President of the 
Senate, and so the text explicitly designates the Chief Justice as the 
presiding officer.10
They failed, however, to consider that the Vice-President might 
also be impeached. Rather than designating the Chief Justice to 
preside over these trials as well, the text leaves this task to the 
President of the Senate.11 Read literally, the Constitution seems to 
7 We explain later why the vice-presidency was a functional imperative, given the 
Framers’ ingenious voting system. See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
8 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be 
President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”). 
9 U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (authorizing “remov[al] from Office” of “[t]he President, 
Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States . . . on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”). 
10 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Im-
peachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. 
When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And 
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members 
present.”). 
11 Article I, § 3, clause 4 of the United States Constitution designates the Vice-
President as “President of the Senate,” while Article I, § 3, clause 6 explicitly desig-
nates the Chief Justice as presiding officer “[w]hen the President . . . is tried” in an 
impeachment, yet does not expand this exception to include vice-presidential im-
peachments. It is true, of course, that Article I, § 3, clause 5 authorizes the Senate to 
choose other officers, including a President Pro Tem, and implicitly authorizes the lat-
ter to preside “in the absence of the Vice President.” This provision would allow the 
Vice-President voluntarily to vacate his place at the podium during his impeachment 
trial, but nothing in the text requires this. Even if the Vice-President passed the gavel 
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authorize the Vice-President to preside over his own impeach-
ment.12
Our present problem reflects the same sort of technical incom-
petence. Although the Vice-President may be perfectly acceptable 
as a ceremonial leader of the Senate, he is a natural candidate in 
the next presidential contest. It is an obvious mistake to designate 
him as the presiding officer over the electoral vote count. The 
temptations for abuse of power are too great—especially since the 
textual description of the vote count procedure is so inadequate. 
Even if the text had been elaborated with great precision, it was 
still wrong to give one candidate any sort of strategic advantage 
over his rivals. The designation of the President of the Senate as 
presiding officer was nothing more than a thoughtless extension of 
a ceremonial post to a position of power. 
If anyone had focused on the matter, the Convention could have 
cured the lapse easily. There was an obvious solution: The Consti-
tution expressly replaced the Vice-President with the Chief Justice 
when it comes to presiding over the Senate during presidential im-
peachments. Just as the Chief Justice displaced him on these occa-
sions, he could have replaced him at the electoral vote count.13
to the President Pro Tem, that senator could be a blatant partisan who might use his 
power either to protect or to destroy the incumbent. Rather than allowing the Presi-
dent Pro Tem to intervene, the Framers should have placed the Chief Justice in con-
trol of vice-presidential, as well as presidential, impeachments. 
12 We are certainly not the first to make this point. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The 
Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis 64–65 (1996); 
Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presi-
dential Immunity Decision, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1341, 1357 & n.72 (1983); Stephen 
Carter, The Role of the Courts in Separation of Powers Disputes, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 
669, 675 (1990); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 
14 Const. Comment. 245, 245–46 (1997); Richard M. Pious, Impeaching the President: 
The Intersection of Constitutional and Popular Law, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 859, 862 n.15 
(1999). But see Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succes-
sion Law Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 122 n.59 (1995) (arguing that general 
conflict-of-interest principles prevent Vice-Presidents from presiding over their own 
impeachment trials); John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the Problems of 
Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 Fordham L. Rev. 457, 462 & n.30 (1964) 
(noting that “[p]resumably” the President Pro Tem of the Senate would preside). 
13 The Founders had demonstrated a general awareness of the problems of asking an 
official to serve as a judge in his own case. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 10, at 47 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his 
own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improba-
bly, corrupt his integrity.”). 
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But the Convention never spotted this problem, or its obvious 
cure, and the forces of intellectual inertia propelled the President 
of the Senate into an unsuitable role. This failure is understand-
able, if not precisely excusable. The Convention spent an enor-
mous amount of time on methods for selecting the President, re-
peatedly failing to find a solution that commanded enduring 
support. Hoping to get out of Philadelphia, the delegates finally 
pushed the problem onto the docket of a special committee, 
chaired by David Brearley, charged with solving previously ir-
resolvable issues.14 Despite the pressures of time, the delegates did 
spend most of two days—September 5 and 6, 1787—on the Brear-
ley proposals,15 but two days were not nearly enough to confront all 
the problems involved in their novel design. There were many lar-
ger questions at stake than the role of the President of the Senate. 
With their eyes wandering to the exits, the Framers never focused 
on the absurdity of their job assignment.16
So our problem arises as the result of technical incompetence at 
the Founding—which does not make it any less of a problem. 
B. A World Without Parties 
To set the stage further, consider the larger structure within 
which John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were operating at the 
moment of the vote count. We must return to the original under-
standing of the Electoral College before the enactment of the 
Twelfth Amendment. This requires something more than the mas-
14 Called the “Committee of Postponed Parts,” the Brearley group was selected on 
August 31, 1787. 1 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of 
the Federal Constitution 280 (Jonathan Elliott ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1941) (1836) 
[hereinafter Elliot]. It was composed of eleven elected members, one from each par-
ticipating state. Id. 
15 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 505–31 (Max Farrand ed., 
1937) [hereinafter Farrand]. 
16 By far the best treatment of the Electoral College is provided by Professor 
Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc 
Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. Am. Hist. 35 (1986). Slonim is particu-
larly effective in demonstrating how the Electoral College cleverly solved a host of 
key problems at the time—most notably (1) enabling the small states and the slave 
states to extend to the presidency the disproportionate voting power they had won 
previously in the design of Congress, while (2) allowing the Convention to accommo-
date separation-of-powers principles. Id. at 51–58. A discussion of these dimensions is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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tery of a few antiquated rules. These rules were based on an en-
tirely different vision of American politics, and we will not get very 
far without grasping how this Founding vision differs from our 
own.
For modern Americans, the two-party system is a pillar of de-
mocratic life. Fair competition between political parties is viewed 
as the great engine for disciplining despotic power. For us, an elec-
tion without party competition is no election at all. 
This was not so for the Founders. They equated party with fac-
tion, and thought parties an unmitigated evil. Worse yet, they did 
not reach this judgment after soberly considering the democratic 
case for party competition. Nothing resembling the modern party 
system had yet emerged as a historical reality.17
Nor did classical republican theory encourage the Founders to 
glimpse the future that lay just over the horizon. The great republi-
can writers of the past—Aristotle and Cicero, Machiavelli and 
Harrington—presented very different visions of the well-ordered 
state. They were alike, however, in one crucial respect: Each 
equated party division with factional strife and deemed it the great 
nemesis of civilization. Republics died when leaders factionalized, 
with each cabal placing its narrow interests ahead of the public 
good. The result was an escalating cycle of instability and incivility, 
culminating in the despotic ascendancy of a Caesar or a Cromwell. 
The fundamental challenge was somehow to induce leaders to put 
the public good ahead of their own—and to sustain the unity of the 
Commonwealth against the ever-present dangers of factional disin-
tegration.18
These classical teachings resonated with the Founders’ revolu-
tionary experience. During their struggle against England, political 
division meant weakness before the imperial foe and bordered on 
betrayal: We will all hang separately if we do not hang together. 
This attitude, once formed and battle-hardened, was difficult to 
transcend.
17 Even in England, the words “Whig” and “Tory” referred largely to extended group-
ings of elite families, locked in factional struggle for power and patronage. L.B. Nam-
ier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (1929). For an apprecia-
tion of Namier as a political historian, see Linda Colley, Lewis Namier 46–71 (1989).
18 For a penetrating survey of eighteenth-century opposition to the notion of politi-
cal parties, see Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System 1–39 (1969). 
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Even Madison did not attempt to do so. His work at the Consti-
tutional Convention and in The Federalist linked party with faction, 
condemning it as evil.19 Madison’s aim was to use Enlightenment 
political science to design a better constitutional machine to con-
strain the beast.20 Rather than organizing a sound two-party system, 
the Madisonian republic tried to create a space for leaders to tran-
scend the rule of faction altogether. The Constitution’s basic tactic 
is divide-and-conquer. By creating government on a continental 
scale, the Framers hoped to make it difficult to organize large par-
ties: Rather than one or two continental groupings, there would be 
a host of self-interested factions pushing and shoving for power. 
This labile structure would make it possible for patrician civic 
leaders like George Washington to rise above the fray and govern 
in the public interest. Rather than draft a Constitution for a two-
party democracy, the Framers sought to organize a non-party re-
public.21
Though this notion is strange to us, the original design of the 
Electoral College makes no sense without it. For us, it seems only 
natural for the major parties to take on the primary burden of se-
lecting the leading candidates for the presidency, but this was a 
non-starter for the Framers. Rather than delegating this task to po-
litical parties, they hoped to design a scheme by which great 
statesmen would transcend the dynamics of faction. The model for 
such a leader, of course, sat before them as the presiding officer of 
the Constitutional Convention: George Washington. The challenge 
was to construct a system that would enable others like him to rise 
to the top. 
The problem was made more acute by the nature of eighteenth-
century society. Politics, much more so than now, was emphatically 
local. Commercial and landed elites might compete for attention in 
each of the states, but few local leaders would have the opportunity 
to prove their mettle on a national basis. 
19 For a general discussion on the role of faction at the time of the Founding, see 
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, at 559–60 
(1969). 
20 See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 165–99 (1991). 
21 Hofstadter, supra note 18, at 40–73; Daniel Sisson, The American Revolution of 
1800, at 23–69 (1974). 
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As the Founders well understood, the war against England pro-
vided the revolutionary generation with exceptional opportunities 
to project themselves onto the continental stage. By virtue of their 
service in the patriots’ army, Washington and others had demon-
strated their republican virtue—or lack of it—to an attentive audi-
ence in all thirteen states. The difficulties of wartime coordination 
also required civilian politicians to engage in extraordinary levels 
of interstate interaction as well as mutual assessment. But in ordi-
nary times, would there be a steady supply of such “Continental 
Characters”?22
The more optimistic members of the Convention predicted that 
“Continental Characters will multiply as we more & more coa-
lesce,”23 but others were not so sure.24 Unless steps were taken, 
each state’s electors might join together and vote for a favorite son, 
leading to perplexity when all the votes were counted. This is 
where the Founders tried to economize on the short supply of true 
leaders through clever institutional engineering. Why not give two
votes to each elector, but allow him to cast only one for a citizen 
from his own state? As Gouverneur Morris explained, “one vote is 
to be given to a man out of the State, and as this vote will not be 
thrown away, • • the votes will fall on characters eminent & gener-
ally known.”25
The vice-presidency became a functional imperative at this stage 
in the constitutional design. If the Framers had trusted electors to 
ignore local favorites, they might well have dispensed with the of-
22 2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 501 (remarks of James Wilson, Sept. 4, 1787). 
23 Id. (remarks of James Wilson, Sept. 4, 1787); see also id. (remarks of Abraham 
Baldwin, Sept. 4, 1787) (discussing how “increasing intercourse among the people of 
the States, would render important characters less & less unknown”). 
24 George Mason was the most emphatic, asserting that a winner would fail to be se-
lected “nineteen times in twenty.” Id. at 500 (remarks of George Mason, Sept. 4, 
1787); see also id. at 512 (remarks of George Mason, Sept. 5, 1787). 
25 Id. at 512 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris, Sept. 5, 1787). Morris was Pennsyl-
vania’s representative on the Brearley Committee of Postponed Parts, which was re-
sponsible for the Electoral College plan but did not make a formal report in support 
of its recommendations. Since Morris’s arguments mesh so tightly with the Commit-
tee’s proposal, it is likely that they were broadly shared, especially since analogous 
points were made earlier in the Convention by other members of the Brearley Com-
mittee. See id. at 113 (remarks of Hugh Williamson, July 25, 1787); id. (remarks of 
Gouverneur Morris, July 25, 1787); id. at 114 (remarks of James Madison, July 25, 
1787).
ACKERMANPRE1ST 3/18/04 7:34 PM 
2004] Thomas Jefferson 561
fice.26 Instead of creating a do-nothing (and politically mischievous) 
President of the Senate, they could have responded to the problem 
of presidential death or resignation by simply designating an offi-
cial—perhaps the Secretary of State, perhaps the Speaker of the 
House—to serve as acting President until a special election could 
be held. In fact, this was the method used by the Second Congress 
to resolve the succession problem if both the President and Vice-
President died or resigned.27
The Framers’ ingenious two-vote system, however, invited the 
creation of two distinct offices. Without the vice-presidency, elec-
tors might leave one of their ballots blank and vote the other for a 
native son. But with the second spot in existence, the electors 
would hardly let it go to waste. One can imagine the thought proc-
ess: “Of course George Washington is an out-of-stater, but I might 
as well vote for the best man since the Constitution requires me to 
move beyond our favorite sons. And in any event, I did get a 
chance to cast a ballot for our regional favorite, the Honorable 
John Q. Squire, who might even have a chance to be Vice-
President!” Although most Vice-Presidents would likely waste 
their time in office as senatorial figureheads, this was beside the 
point. The underlying goal was to construct a clever system for se-
lecting a President with a broad-based reputation for political vir-
tue. When Elbridge Gerry (himself a future Vice-President) ex-
pressed a desire to eliminate the office, another delegate—Hugh 
Williamson of North Carolina—responded that “such an officer as 
26 See generally Amar & Amar, supra note 12, at 113–26 (arguing that Cabinet offi-
cials should follow the Vice-President in presidential succession). In the context of 
our argument, the Founders could have saved the step of creating a Vice-President 
and gone straight to Cabinet succession.
27 The first succession statute contemplated a special election in such circumstances, 
designating the President Pro Tempore of the Senate to serve in the interim. Act of 
March 1, 1792, ch. 8, §§ 9–10, 1 Stat. 239, 240–41 (repealed 1886). In 1886, Congress 
passed a law removing the President Pro Tempore and the Speaker of the House 
from the line of succession, and placed members of the Cabinet in the line of succes-
sion. Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, § 1, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947). This statute also al-
lowed Congress to decide whether to call a special election to pick a new President. 
Id. In 1947, Congress passed a new law redesigning the line of succession after the 
Vice-President, which also eliminated all authority for a special election. See 3 U.S.C. 
§ 19 (2000). The Twenty-fifth Amendment, effective in 1967, provides a procedure for 
replacing the Vice-President in a rapid fashion, hopefully rendering unnecessary the 
invocation of the provisions of the 1947 statute. U.S. Const. amend. XXV. 
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vice-President was not wanted. He was introduced only for the 
sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be cho-
sen at the same time.”28
The original design had a second clever feature. Suppose, as was 
the case in both 1796 and 1800, that the College contained 138 
members who cast 276 votes. Under the 1787 Constitution, the top 
choice could become President even if his name appeared on only 
seventy of the 276 votes.29 The point of the Enlightenment machine 
was to construct the impression that the President was a man of 
truly national character even if the pickings were pretty slim. A 
man could become President when he was the second choice of a 
bare majority of electors. 
Even this clever expedient could sometimes fail to produce the 
simulacrum of a George Washington. Politics might become so 
state-centered that no candidate could gain even a minimal level of 
national support. How to proceed? 
The Brearley Committee proposed a back-up procedure under 
which the President would be selected by the Senate from the top 
five vote-getters in the Electoral College.30 But the Senate had al-
ready been granted many special powers, and granting it still more 
threatened to give the entire system an “aristocratic complexion.”31
This objection proved persuasive, leading to the most peculiar vot-
ing system known to our constitutional system. The Convention 
shifted the locus of authority from the Senate to the House, but re-
tained the Senate’s principle of equality in state voting power. For 
28 2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 537. 
29 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The Electors shall meet in their respective States 
and vote by Ballot for two Persons. . . . The Person having the greatest Number of 
Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of 
Electors appointed . . . .”) (amended 1804). The Twelfth Amendment, effective in 
1804, changed this rule. U.S. Const. amend. XII (“The Electors shall meet in their re-
spective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President . . . they shall 
name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the per-
son voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted 
for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of 
votes for each . . . . The person having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President. . . . The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-
President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole 
number of Electors appointed.”).
30 2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 494.
31 Id. at 524 (remarks of Hugh Williamson, Sept. 6, 1787); see id. at 527 (remarks of 
Roger Sherman, Sept. 6, 1787); id. (remarks of George Mason, Sept. 6, 1787). 
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presidential purposes only, each state delegation in the House 
would cast a single vote—Delaware’s single representative and 
Virginia’s large delegation counting equally32—and the balloting 
would proceed until a candidate received the votes of an absolute 
majority of the states.33
This transformation of the people’s House into a state-centered 
assembly may seem odd to us, but it made quite a bit of sense 
within the overall Founding framework. To put the point in nu-
merical terms: If no single candidate garnered as many as seventy 
of the 276 votes cast by 138 electors, this would indicate that 
American politics had taken an emphatically decentralizing turn. 
As a consequence, should not the back-up mechanism likewise de-
centralize by giving an equal vote to each state in the Union? 
Perhaps, though, strong nationalists like Madison and Hamilton 
were not convinced. They tried to eliminate the back-up proce-
dure, or at least reduce the frequency of its use.34 These efforts 
were successfully resisted by the small states, which feared that 
electors from three or four large states might otherwise be in a po-
sition to dictate the presidential choice when a consensus candidate 
32 In 1800, for example, Virginia’s population of 807,557 (and its twenty-two repre-
sentatives) and Delaware’s population of 64,273 (and its one representative) would 
each be afforded a single vote in the House runoff. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical 
Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957, at 13, 693 (1960). 
33 The Senate retained the power to select a Vice-President. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, 
cl. 3 (“In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest 
Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should re-
main two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot 
the Vice President.”) (amended 1804). The Twelfth Amendment altered this scheme. 
U.S. Const. amend. XII (“The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-
President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole 
number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two 
highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President.”).
34 2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 513 (remarks of James Madison, Sept. 5, 1787) (“Mr 
Madison considered it as a primary object to render an eventual resort to any part of 
the Legislature improbable.”). Later in the day, Madison and Williamson moved to 
amend the Brearley proposal to enable the Electoral College to name the President if 
“• • of the Electors should vote for the same person.” Id. at 514. In 1800, this would 
have permitted a presidential candidate to gain office on the basis of forty-six out of 
the 276 ballots cast by the electors. Hamilton would have gone further, eliminating 
the back-up procedure entirely and awarding the presidency to the Electoral College 
winner regardless of the number of his electoral votes. Id. at 525 (remarks of Alexan-
der Hamilton, Sept. 6, 1787). 
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was lacking.35 If no national figure could gain one of the two places 
on a majority of the electors’ ballots, the small states insisted on a 
runoff in the House in which each state counted equally. Under 
this scenario, the large states might dominate the process of nomi-
nation, but the small ones had a large say in the final decision. 
All this may have seemed sensible enough, but the time devoted 
to hammering it out led the Convention to slight a second design 
issue. This did not involve the failure of a candidate of continental 
stature to emerge from the Electoral College, but a mathematical 
oddity arising from the complexities of the emerging design. Since 
the Founders had given each elector two votes in their desire to 
overcome localism, it was now mathematically possible for several 
candidates to turn up on a majority of ballots—indeed, two could 
end up in a dead heat, with each winning, say, seventy-three votes 
apiece. How to break this tie? 
This question raises issues distinct from those involved when no
presidential candidate has gained widespread support. In the no-
majority case, the small states might reasonably suppose that the 
leader in the Electoral College would be a “favorite son” from a 
large state. After all, these local favorites could fish from a larger 
pool of electors than notables from small states, and so they would 
get to the top of a long list of candidates of merely local eminence. 
Since the small states would not play a major role in nominating 
candidates, it was reasonable for them to insist on greater impor-
tance in the final selection. 
But the small states had no similar grievance when two candi-
dates tied with the same majority vote total. Under this scenario, 
both candidates would have won their seventy-three votes by col-
lecting electors from states of all sizes. In contrast to the no-
majority case, there was no obvious bias against the small states in 
the tied-majority case. It follows that the Founders’ odd voting 
rule—under which each state delegation in the House cast a single 
35 The anxieties of the small states served as a leitmotiv throughout the Conven-
tion’s interminable discussions of the presidential selection problem. See Slonim, su-
pra note 16, at 48–51, 55–56. Indeed, when Madison proposed to dilute the required 
Electoral College majority, he immediately encountered the objection that his 
amendment “would put it in the power of three or four States to put in whom they 
pleased.” 2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 514 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry, Sept. 5, 1787). 
Madison’s proposal lost by a vote of nine-to-two. Id. 
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ballot to select a President—was distinctly undermotivated in the 
tied-majority context. While it might have been sensible to give 
equal voting power to big Virginia and little Delaware when no 
candidate gained broad national support, this curious rule made lit-
tle sense when two broad-based candidacies gained precisely the 
same number of votes. 
Generally speaking, the delegates were quite skilled at identify-
ing fine-grained issues of institutional design. Indeed, they spotted 
an analogous issue in an earlier debate on presidential selection, 
but nothing came of it.36 If they had given themselves adequate 
time, some sharp-eyed delegate likely would have remarked upon 
the distinctive character of the tied-majority case. Time was run-
ning short, however, when the Brearley proposals came to the 
floor, and no one focused on the problem in the rush to resolve a 
host of more contentious issues.37
The Founders’ lapse can be extenuated if we recall that they 
were legislating for a world without national political parties. In 
such a world, centuries might go by without a dead-heat between 
36 On August 24, 1787, the Convention was considering a plan under which the 
President would be selected by a joint session of the House and Senate, each member 
casting a single ballot, and the delegates spotted a potential problem posed by a tie 
vote. 2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 403 (“Mr. Read moved ‘that in case the numbers for 
the two highest in votes should be equal, then the President of the Senate shall have 
an additional casting vote’, which was disagreed to by a general negative.”). 
37 The window of opportunity for issue-spotting was particularly narrow, given the 
proposal that came to the floor. Recall that the Brearley Committee had initially pro-
posed that the Senate, not the House, be given the task of selecting a President under 
the back-up procedure. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. If the Senate had 
retained this task, the Convention would have had no choice but to maintain a voting 
rule that granted equality to each state. It was only when the Convention voted to 
shift the locus of selection authority to the House that new design options, and con-
comitant complications, arose. But this vote occurred on September 6, toward the end 
of the Convention’s debates. Here is Madison’s report of the critical colloquy: 
Mr. Williamson suggested as better than an eventual choice by the Senate, that 
this choice should be made by the Legislature, voting by States and not per cap-
ita.
Mr. Sherman suggested the House of Reps. as preferable to “the Legislature”, 
and moved, accordingly, 
To strike out the words “The Senate shall immediately choose &c.” and insert 
“The House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them 
for President, the members from each State having one vote.” 
Col: Mason liked the latter mode best as lessening the aristocratic influence of 
the Senate. 
2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 527. 
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two candidates with the national stature required to win a majority. 
Did not the Convention have better things to do than create wheels 
within wheels for dealing with such an unlikely possibility? 
Rather than create an entirely new voting system for the tied-
majority case, the Convention modified only one feature of its 
standard House runoff to take it into account. If the odd case did 
arise, the Constitution provides that only the two candidates 
locked in the tie would enter the House runoff. When all candi-
dates fell short of a majority, however, the five leading candidates 
enter the runoff (even if the top two were tied).
Since this rule-within-a-rule is central to our story, the relevant 
constitutional text deserves careful scrutiny: 
The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the 
President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of 
Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such 
Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of 
Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them 
for President; and if no person have a Majority, then from the 
five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse 
the President.38
Since these rules are rather complex, we explore their operation 
through a series of mathematical examples. Begin with the case of 
perfect compliance, where the electoral vote count proceeds with-
out a legal hitch. During both the elections of 1796 and 1800, there 
were 138 electors casting 256 votes for President. So long as we as-
sume perfect compliance, the operation of the runoff rules is 
straightforward. The magic number is seventy: “a Majority of the 
whole Number of Electors appointed.” If the two leading candi-
dates tie with seventy votes or more, the text requires a two-man 
runoff; if they get sixty-nine or less, it requires the two leaders to 
join in a race involving the top five candidates. 
Matters get trickier when there is imperfect compliance, since 
there are two different ways in which a state may fail to register its 
electoral preferences. The first scenario arose in 1796 and involved 
Vermont. The problem—or so it was alleged—was that the state 
had failed to appoint its four electors in a legally valid fashion. As 
38 U.S. Const. art. 2, § 1, cl. 3 (amended 1804) (emphasis added). 
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we shall see, this charge was rejected. If the attack on Vermont had 
been upheld, however, the total number of electors “appointed” by 
the states would have amounted only to 134, not 138. This reduc-
tion, in turn, would have required a change in the “magic number” 
of electoral votes needed to avoid a five-candidate runoff. With 
only 134 electors “appointed,” the constitutional majority required 
was no longer seventy, but sixty-eight, votes. 
A different result obtains under the second scenario of imperfect 
compliance, which arose in 1800 and involved Georgia. This time 
around, nobody alleged that Georgia had failed to make a valid 
appointment of its four electors. The difficulty arose only at the 
second stage—the four electors did not cast ballots that satisfied 
the formal requirements laid down by the Constitution. While this 
might have resulted in the disqualification of the four Georgia 
votes, it did not require a recalculation of the “magic number.” 
Since Georgia’s electors had undoubtedly been “appointed,” the 
number of electors from the entire Union remained at 138, and 
candidates required a majority of at least seventy votes to avoid a 
five-man runoff in the House. 
This point would create a big problem when Jefferson presided 
over the electoral vote count of 1801. But we are now talking about 
1787. As the days grew short in September, nobody at the Conven-
tion worried about the outside chance that an incumbent Vice-
President, sitting as the President of the Senate, might manipulate 
an oddball rule to push himself into a House runoff with one rival 
rather than four. There were many more serious things to think 
about, as the Framers contemplated the fierce struggle for ratifica-
tion that lay ahead. 
II. THE VERMONT PRECEDENT
Washington’s presence at the head of the Constitutional Con-
vention assured the delegates that their larger vision of a non-party 
republic was a living reality. Here was a man who had proved his 
public spirit through years of selfless service on the battlefield. This 
demonstration of “public character,” not any display of partisan 
wiles, would predictably win him a unanimous vote for the presi-
dency.39 Once he had set the nation on the right course, would the 
39 See James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection 41–88 (1979). 
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constitutional machine assist his successors in sustaining his exam-
ple of nonpartisan statesmanship? 
Washington was grimly determined to try. He included both 
Hamilton and Jefferson in his first Cabinet, and desperately sought 
to keep these great rivals in harness. But it was not to be. By the 
end of his first administration, the two party leaders were already 
locked in highly charged ideological conflict, and by the time 
Washington left office, the division between Federalists and Re-
publicans had come to dominate the political scene. 40 The ink was 
hardly dry on the Constitution before its fundamental political 
premise began to disintegrate. America was becoming a proto-
modern two-party democracy, raising entirely unexpected chal-
lenges to the Founding design for a republic dominated by non-
party notables.41
A. The Rise of Party 
Washington’s Farewell Address nicely framed the transition to 
this new order.42 On the one hand, it was a great act of nonpartisan 
statesmanship—in refusing a third term in office, Washington es-
tablished a precedent against the pernicious tendency toward 
presidencies-for-life. On the other hand, partisan politics provided 
a backdrop to Washington’s grave farewell. He postponed his an-
nouncement until September 17, 1796. This put the Republicans at 
a serious disadvantage in the presidential election campaign, as Jef-
ferson and his supporters were not prepared to contest Washing-
ton’s decision to continue in office.43 Nevertheless, the Republicans 
almost managed to defeat John Adams, Washington’s Vice-
President and a man devoted to Washington’s non-party ideal, who 
40 For a recent blow-by-blow account of the politics of the 1790s, see Bernard A. 
Weisberger, America Afire: Jefferson, Adams, and the Revolutionary Election of 
1800 (2000). 
41 To be sure, there were many respects in which the two-party competition of the 
1790s differed from that of subsequent periods. Professor Ackerman explores this 
matter at greater length in his other work. See Bruce Ackerman, America on the 
Brink: The Constitutional Crisis of the Early Republic 25–43 (2001) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
42 A perceptive treatment of both the politics and substance of the Farewell Address 
is provided in Stanley Elkins & Eric McKittrick, The Age of Federalism 489–97 
(1993).
43 See generally id. (discussing partisan aspects of Washington’s Farewell Address).
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was now obliged to make his way in the ascendant world of party 
politics. 
Adams’s official position as Vice-President and his past service 
to the country made him an obvious candidate, but Alexander 
Hamilton was the true leader of the Federalist Party. Hamilton at-
tempted to manipulate the Founders’ ingenious two-vote system to 
deprive Adams of the presidency without allowing Thomas Jeffer-
son to take the prize.44 His scheme involved propelling the Federal-
ists’ second candidate, Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina,45 to 
first place in the Electoral College. If every Federalist elector in 
the north voted for both Adams and Pinckney, this would allow 
South Carolina to put its favorite son ahead by voting for Pinckney 
but not Adams. To achieve this end, Hamilton engaged in some 
devious maneuvers that created a problem when the time came for 
the President of the Senate to count the votes. 
For Hamilton’s scheme to succeed, he needed to convince the 
northern Federalists to resist the temptations of regional favoritism 
in their second ballot choices and cast their ballots for Pinckney as 
well as Adams. Professor Manning Dauer tells the story: 
[Hamilton] attempted to supply the stimulus which would cause 
the electors to support Pinckney. In the Boston Centinel of De-
cember 7, just as the electors were meeting, the following para-
graph appeared, under a New York date line of November 26: 
“We have good authority to believe the election of electors in 
Vermont is invalid—–being grounded on a Resolve of the Legis-
lature, not a law.” 
    Underneath this there appeared a note by the editor declaring 
that it was certainly to be hoped that this would not be true. If so, 
it shows the “necessity of union in the electors.”46
The editor’s implicit logic was clear enough. Since the race with the 
Republicans was going to be close, the loss of Vermont’s four votes 
44 The best account is provided by Dauer, supra note 5, at 92–111.
45 Not to be confused with Charles Pinckney, who ran as Adams’s running mate in 
1800. Thomas Pinckney had recently returned home after negotiating a popular treaty 
with Spain. See Frances Leigh Williams, A Founding Family: The Pinckneys of South 
Carolina 304–09 (1978).
46 Dauer, supra note 5, at 103. 
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for Adams and Pinckney might mean that the only Federalist who 
could beat Jefferson was Pinckney, aided by South Carolina’s fa-
vorite-son vote. While South Carolina’s desertion of Adams might 
be regrettable, surely Pinckney was better than Jefferson. 
Hamilton’s rumor failed to generate its desired effect.47 Despite 
the disheartening news from Vermont, only thirteen of Massachu-
setts’s electors voted a straight Adams-Pinckney ticket.48 The other 
three voted for Adams but then cast a ballot for regional favor-
ites—as did ten other Federalist electors from northern states. As a 
consequence, Pinckney lagged far behind Adams in the electoral 
vote—he received only fifty-nine votes to Adams’s seventy-one. 
This gave the vice-presidency to Jefferson, with sixty-eight votes. 
Jefferson’s running mate, Aaron Burr, was also victimized by fa-
vorite-son voting, and gained only thirty votes.49
Though Hamilton’s stratagem failed to produce northern soli-
darity for Pinckney, it did succeed in casting a shadow on the vote-
counting ritual. If Vermont’s four votes were ruled invalid, Adams 
would lose the presidency to Jefferson by a single vote, sixty-eight 
to sixty-seven.50 With remarkable speed, the Framers’ technical 
47 Hamilton also impugned the Vermont vote in personal correspondence. On De-
cember 1, 1796, he wrote to Jeremiah Wadsworth of his plan to throw the election to 
Thomas Pinckney, stating that: 
 Judge Tichener in passing through informed me that from something which 
had occurred to his recollection while here he feared that the votes of Vermont 
would be lost for want of being warranted by a subsisting legislative Act. If so, 
Adams will not have sufficient votes to prevent the question going to the House 
of Representatives & then we can be at no loss for the result. The whole num-
ber I venture to depend on for Adams (including Vermont & two in Pennsyl-
vania) is 73. Take off Vermont and there will be 69 which is less by one than the 
whole number of Electors. 
 It may be said that Georgia also is irregular. This I do not consider as certain. 
But if so at first there was time enough to discover & rectify it. Not so as to 
Vermont. Besides who will take care to have the necessary authentic proof from 
Georgia? From Vermont it can be had & our patriots are not likely to neglect it. 
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jeremiah Wadsworth (Dec. 1, 1796), in 20 The 
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 418, 418 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974) (footnote call 
numbers omitted). The editor of Hamilton’s papers notes that “Tichener” is Isaac 
Tichenor of Vermont, later a Federalist senator and then governor of the state. Id. at 
419 n.3. 
48 3 Annals of Cong. 1543 (1797). 
49 Id. at 1543–44 (reporting entire tally). 
50 If Vermont’s selection of its electors had in fact been invalid, Jefferson’s sixty-
eight votes would have sufficed to gain him the presidency without a runoff. Without 
Vermont’s four electors, only 134 Electors would have been validly appointed, and a 
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blunders were coming home to roost. It was a serious enough mis-
take to allow the sitting Vice-President to preside over his own 
election returns in the gentlemanly world of non-party notables. 
But this error was compounded once the vice-presidency had be-
come swept up in the overheated context of a new and unfamiliar 
form of party competition. How would the system respond to the 
challenge?
B. Rumors and Restraint 
The four Vermont electors for President and Vice-President cast 
their ballots on December 7, 179651—two full months before John 
Adams was scheduled to preside over the vote count on February 
8, 1797. As word of the Vermont votes trickled out of Montpelier 
to the larger world, newspapers and politicians throughout the 
country attacked their validity.52 The New York Minerva & Mer-
cantile Evening Advertiser began the controversy on November 26:  
majority of these amounted to sixty-eight votes. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The 
Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be 
a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed . . . .”) (amended 1804) (em-
phasis added). See supra note 38 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
51 The original electoral votes from Vermont state this date explicitly. For a report 
describing our inspection of the Vermont electoral votes, and where they can be 
found, see infra note 106.
52 We reviewed the following newspapers: (1) Columbian Centinel from Boston, 
Massachusetts: Editions from June 1796–March 18, 1797 were examined because Pro-
fessor Dauer quotes this newspaper as covering the situation surrounding the Ver-
mont votes, Dauer, supra note 5, at 103–04; (2) South-Carolina State Gazette: Editions 
from July 4, 1796–February 1797 were examined because it is a southern newspaper, 
and a Vermont newspaper story stated that there were no problems with the Vermont 
votes and that it was all part of some sort of southern plot; (3) Columbian Mirror & 
Alexandria Gazette: Editions from October 1796–February 1797 were examined be-
cause it is another southern newspaper and one published in Thomas Jefferson’s 
home state (Jefferson had much to gain if the Vermont votes were deemed invalid); 
(4) Kentucky Gazette: Editions from December 1796–March 1797 were examined to 
determine if there was any mention of the problems with the Kentucky electoral 
votes, discussed infra note 75, and also because it was another (at least quasi-) 
“southern” newspaper; (5) Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser: Editions from October 
1796–February 1797 were examined because its publisher, Simon Greenleaf, was a 
prominent Republican, see Jerome Mushkat, Matthew Livingston Davis and the Po-
litical Legacy of Aaron Burr, in 3 American Cities 109, 109 (Neil Larry Shumsky ed., 
1996), and problems with the Vermont votes would have worked in favor of the Re-
publican party; (6) Aurora & General Advertiser: Editions from June 1796–February 
1797 were examined because it was printed in the capitol city at the time of the elec-
tion; and (7) Gazette of the United States: Editions from June 1796–February 1797 
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      We have good authority to believe the election of Electors in 
Vermont is invalid—being grounded only on a Resolve of the 
Legislature, not a law. This is supposed to have been known to 
the ‘Patriots,’ of that State at the time. It being now too late to 
correct the mistake, it has leaked out in whispers.53
Newspaper attacks on the Vermont vote continued through De-
cember.54
were examined because it was the leading Federalist newspaper published in the capi-
tol city.
53 Minerva & Mercantile Evening Advertiser (New York), Nov. 26, 1796, at 3. 
54 On November 30, the Gazette of the United States reported that “Vermont, who 
has chosen electors, is to have no vote on the occasion.” Gazette of the United States 
(Philadelphia), Nov. 30, 1796, at 3. As we have seen, Professor Dauer emphasizes a 
December 7 story from the Columbian Centinel. Dauer, supra note 5, at 103–04. Here 
is the full Centinel text: 
The account received in town yesterday of the probable loss of the Vermont
votes for President and Vice-President, may have an unfortunate effect on the 
decision of the Electors of this State. Every one feels deeply interested in the 
event, and the subject was yesterday discussed in the different private circles. 
Too many opinions have appeared to preponderate in favour of supporting Mr. 
PINCKNEY, at the risque of sacrificing Mr. ADAMS; but it will become the 
electors to consider that the voice of the people at large ought to be their guide. 
If we mean to make our contribution respectable in the eyes of Europeans, if 
we mean to prove that a republican government signifies the expression of the 
public voice, we must make it appear that the public voice designates the man 
who is to fill the first office in our government. If this is not the case, we had 
better at once trust all to the benevolence of Providence, for ours will become a 
government of chance, and of the worst kind of chance. Not only our national 
dignity, but all our essential interests depend upon our respective offices being 
filled by the men contemplated by the people; and if ever this great principle is 
done away, the loss of our liberties must soon follow. Besides all this, are we not 
to consider a little what is due to Mr. ADAMS? Will it be grateful, will it be just 
to act as if we looked upon him only as a convenience; that we think it will be 
well enough to have him for President, but as well to have any body else? More 
than all, and we ought seriously to weigh it, Mr. ADAMS it is ascertained by 
the best information from the different States, will have a greater number of 
votes than Mr. JEFFERSON even if Vermont is out of the question. Shall a 
momentary pusillanimity in Mr. ADAMS’s friends put Mr. PINCKNEY in the 
presidential chair? Shall we by grasping at a shadow, lose the substance? No, 
Mr. RUSSELL, firmness is expected in the electors, and from their characters 
we may fairly presume they will not disappoint the public. 
Columbian Centinel (Boston), Dec. 7, 1796, at 2. The Aurora & General Advertiser of 
December reported that “[t]he Vermont election is said to be illegal from the non-
existence of any law or resolution under which the Electors could act. The law under 
which they voted four years ago was temporary, and from a mistaken impression that 
it was of a permanent nature the electors of that State find themselves unauthorized.” 
Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 12, 1796, at 2. On December 17, 
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These reports contained three charges. The first denied that 
Vermont had enacted a valid law authorizing the procedure by 
which it had selected its electors. Though it was broadly recognized 
that Vermont had passed such a law in 1791, “We understand that 
the law alluded to made provision only for the election in 1792, and 
of course then expired.”55 The second claimed that Vermont’s ap-
pointments were invalid because they were made through a “re-
solve” rather than a formal legislative enactment.56 The third ar-
gued that Vermont had violated a 1792 federal statute requiring 
the states to appoint their electors within a period of “thirty-four 
days preceding the first Wednesday in December.”57
however, the Aurora wrote that “[w]e have heard no reason for setting aside the 
Vermont Electors, that appears of importance sufficient to produce so disagreeable 
an effect.” Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at 2; see also 
Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (Dec. 15, 1796), in 16 Madison Papers, 
supra note 5, at 428, 429 (“[T]he probabi[li]ty is that if Vermont has no choice that J. 
will have the majority necessary to his appointm[en]t.”). 
 Newspapers of all political persuasions reported on the problem. The “decidedly 
Republican” Aurora & General Advertiser, David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of 
American Conservatism 419 (1965), carried the most stories, while the “moderately 
Republican” Kentucky Gazette, id. at 423, carried only one. Aurora & General Ad-
vertiser (Philadelphia), Nov. 29, 1796, at 2; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadel-
phia), Nov. 30, 1796, at 2; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 12, 1796, 
at 2; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 15, 1796, at 2; Aurora & Gen-
eral Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at 2; Aurora & General Advertiser 
(Philadelphia), Dec. 29, 1796, at 2; Kentucky Gazette, Jan. 18, 1797, at 2. 
 The “decidedly Federalist” Columbian Centinel, Fischer, supra, at 414, ran a story; 
the “decidedly Federalist” Gazette of the United States, id. at 419, discussed Vermont; 
the “moderately Federalist” Columbian Mirror & Alexandria Gazette, id. at 420, car-
ried a story; the “moderately Federalist” South-Carolina State Gazette, id. at 422, ran 
a story; and the “very moderately Federalist” Minerva & Mercantile Evening Adver-
tiser, id. at 417, discussed the Vermont problem. Columbian Centinel (Boston), Dec. 
7, 1796, at 2; Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Nov. 30, 1796, at 3; Colum-
bian Mirror & Alexandria Gazette (Boston), Dec. 27, 1796, at 3; South-Carolina State 
Gazette, Dec. 20, 1796; Minerva & Mercantile Evening Advertiser (New York), Nov. 
26, 1796, at 3. 
55 Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 29, 1796, at 2; see 2 Smith, su-
pra note 5, at 959 n.23; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at 
2.
56 Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at 2. 
57 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 239, 239; see also U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 
4 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors . . . .”); Aurora & 
General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at 2 (making this argument). 
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None of these charges had legal merit. We have personally ex-
amined the Vermont archives58 and we have determined that the 
1791 statute regulating presidential electors was not a temporary 
measure for 1792 but a standing procedure for the indefinite fu-
ture. Under its terms, Vermont’s electors would be selected by a 
majority of the members of a “Grand Committee” consisting of 
“the Governor and Council and House of Representatives.”59 There 
58 We examined various materials in Vermont. At the State Department of Librar-
ies, we examined: (1) compilations of laws passed by the Vermont state legislature 
from 1778–1799; (2) records of state legislative proceedings from 1778–1799; (3) the 
public papers of Thomas Chittenden, a leading figure in Vermont politics; (4) Ver-
mont electoral statistics; (5) records of the Council of Censors, a body created by the 
Vermont Constitution of 1786 and charged with overseeing the legislative and execu-
tive branches of Vermont for compliance with the state Constitution; (6) editions of 
the Vermont Journal from January 1796–March 1797; (7) editions of the Rutland Her-
ald from January 1796–March 1797; and (8) editions of the Vermont Gazette from 
January 1796–March 1797. At the Secretary of State’s office in Montpelier, we 
searched the personal papers of prominent Vermonters from the 1790s, additional 
personal papers relating to the 1796 presidential electors, and records of the Gover-
nor and Council of Censors. At the Vermont Historical Society in Barre, the personal 
papers of additional prominent Vermonters from the 1790s were examined. Scholar-
ship on early Vermont was also consulted. See, e.g., Roy Bearse, Vermont: A Guide 
to the Green Mountain State (1966); Hosea Beckley, The History of Vermont (Brat-
tleboro, Vt., Geoge A. Salisbury 1846); Cora Cheney, Vermont: The State with the 
Storybook Past (1976); Charles Edward Crane, Let Me Show You Vermont (1937); 
Walter Hill Crockett, Vermont: The Green Mountain State (1921); Men of Vermont 
(Jacob G. Ullery ed., Brattleboro, Vt., Geoge A. Salisbury 1894); Perry H. Merrill, 
Vermont Under Four Flags (1975); Earle Newton, The Vermont Story (1949). Finally, 
we also consulted materials in the archival collections of John Adams (October 1796–
February 1797), Aaron Burr (October 1796–February 1797), and Alexander Hamilton 
(October 1796–February 1797).
59 5 Journals and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of Vermont 
1791–1792, at 82–83 (1970) [hereinafter Vermont General Assembly Proceedings] 
(“The bill entitled, An Act Directing the Mode of Appointing Electors to Elect a 
President and Vice-President of the United States, was read the second time, ac-
cepted, and sent to his Excellency and Council for revision and concurrence, or pro-
posals of amendment.”); id. at 87–88 (“The following bills returned from Council con-
curred, and passed into laws of this State . . . . An Act Directing the Mode of 
Appointing Electors to Elect a President and Vice-President of the United States.”). 
The statute provides: 
An Act Directing the Mode of Appointing Electors to Elect a President and 
Vice President of the United States. November 3D, 1791. It is hereby Enacted 
by the General Assembly of the State of Vermont, That the Electors for elect-
ing a President and Vice President of the United States be appointed by the bal-
lots of the Governor and Council and House of Representatives met in grand 
Committee and that those persons to the number which they have right to ap-
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is abundant evidence indicating that this procedure was followed in 
1796.60
The distinctive character of the Vermont procedure also refutes 
the complaint that the electors were selected through a “resolve” 
rather than ordinary legislation. Since Vermont’s Governor cast a 
ballot for the electors along with members of his council and the 
Vermont House of Assembly, the “Grand Committee” was not an 
ordinary legislative body capable of enacting statutes. The Grand 
Committee chose electors by means of a “resolve” because it was 
specifically delegated this authority by the validly enacted 1791 
statute. And finally, it simply is not true that Vermont had violated 
the federal statute by selecting its electors before the beginning of 
the prescribed thirty-four day period. The records reveal that the 
Grand Committee made its choices on November 4, 1796, thirty-
three days before “the first Wednesday in December.”61
This was not enough, however, to make the charges unimpor-
tant. The newspaper accounts were sufficient to generate a cloud of 
suspicion. If the Republicans had chosen to press the issue, it 
point who shall have a majority of the votes of said Grand Committee shall be 
declared to be duly appointed Electors of this State for the purposes aforesaid. 
15 Laws of Vermont 1791–1795, at 43 (1966). 
60 7 Vermont General Assembly Proceedings, supra note 59, at 350 (1973) (“On mo-
tion of Mr. Farrand, Resolved, That his Excellency the Governor and Council be re-
quested to join the House of Representatives in grand committee tomorrow after-
noon, to proceed by ballot to make choice of electors, to elect the president and vice-
president of the United States.”); id. at 354 (“Agreeably to the order of the day, the 
Governor, Council and House of Assembly, joined in grand committee for the pur-
pose of proceeding, by ballot, to the choice of electors to elect the president and vice-
president of the United States. . . . The ballots being duly and severally taken, Capt. 
Elijah Dewey was declared duly elected, first; Col. Elisha Shelden, second; John 
Bridgman, Esq., third; and Oliver Gallup, Esq., fourth; electors to elect the president 
and vice-president of the United States.”). 
 Newspaper reports confirm this. On November 7, The Rutland Herald reported that 
“On Friday last the following Gentleman were chosen electors for the choice of a 
President for the United States. ELIJAH DEWEY, ELISHA SHELDON, JOHN 
BRIDGMAN, and OLIVER GALLUP, E’qr’s.” Rutland Herald (Vermont), Nov. 7, 
1796, at 3. On November 17, the Gazette of the United States ran a story under a No-
vember 7 Rutland dateline stating that “On Friday last, the following gentlemen were 
chosen Electors for the choice of a President for the United States. Elijah Dewey, El-
isha Sheldon, John Bridgman, and Oliver Gallup, Esqrs.” Gazette of the United 
States (Philadelphia), Nov. 17, 1796, at 3. These are the four names that appear on 
Vermont’s electoral vote.
61 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 239, 239; 7 Vermont General Assembly 
Proceedings, supra note 59, at 350, 354 (1973).
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would have been difficult for Adams or anybody else to respond 
decisively at the time of the vote count. Consider especially the 
first of the three complaints—that the original Vermont protocol 
was a one-shot regulation designed specifically for the 1792 elec-
tion, without legal force for 1796. The only way to learn the truth 
would have been to send a messenger to Vermont to inspect all the 
legislative records, but a round-trip journey to Montpelier would 
have taken weeks.62 All sorts of mischief might have been at-
tempted in the meantime. 
If the Republicans had raised a formal objection, therefore, Ad-
ams would have confronted a very real political problem—but not 
an irresolvable one. He could have responded by rejecting the Re-
publicans’ complaint on the basis of a legal presumption. After all, 
there was nothing formally defective on the face of Vermont’s elec-
toral documents.63 And so the President of the Senate might an-
nounce that the state’s papers were entitled to a presumption of le-
gal regularity that could not be rebutted without a compelling 
showing of an underlying substantive problem. This might seem 
plausible, but the credibility of such a ruling would have been un-
dercut by Adams’s self-interest in the affair. Whatever he might 
say, and however justifiable, his ruling would have eliminated fur-
ther inquiry into votes that provided his crucial margin of victory. 
This would have been a particularly awkward moment for such a 
ruling because 1796 marked the first contested presidential election 
in the nation’s history. There were warring political parties. If Ad-
ams counted himself into the presidency, the Constitution would 
be off to a very bad start, even if the country accepted the legiti-
macy of the outcome. 
Only the self-restraint of the Republican leadership permitted 
the Constitution to avoid this early test of credibility. Rather than 
demagogue the issue, Jefferson self-consciously retired it from pub-
lic view. The Vermont controversy simmered in the newspapers 
62 Clifford L. Lord & Elizabeth H. Lord, Historical Atlas of the United States 79 
(1944). 
63 There was little doubt, closer to election time, that Vermont wished to cast its 
votes for Adams. For example, the South-Carolina State Gazette reported on Novem-
ber 19 that “[t]he Legislature of Vermont choose[s] the Electors for that State. That 
they will be true Federalists is undoubted.” South Carolina State Gazette, Nov. 19, 
1796.
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throughout December,64 and uncertainty about the Vermont vote 
was reflected in the ongoing informal tallies of the electoral vote. 
Since Jefferson was at Monticello throughout this period,65 Madi-
son was functioning as the operational leader in Philadelphia and 
regularly wrote to his chief for marching orders. His letter of 
Christmas Day 1796 begins with the caveat: “I can not yet entirely 
remove the uncertainty in which my last [letter] left the election. 
Unless the Vermont election of which little has of late been said, 
should contain some fatal vice, in it, Mr. Adams may be considered 
as the President elect.”66 Jefferson replied on January 16, 1797: 
I observe doubts are still expressed as to the validity of the Ver-
mont election. Surely in so great a case, substance & not form 
should prevail. I cannot suppose that the Vermont constitution 
has been strict in requiring particular forms of expressing the leg-
islative will. As far as my disclaimer may have any effect, I pray 
you to declare it on every occasion foreseen or not foreseen by 
me, in favor of the choice of the people substantially expressed, 
and to prevent the phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president at so 
early a day.67
Jefferson’s words were decisive: The Vermont controversy dropped 
from public view during the run-up to the formal vote count on 
February 8, with Republican newspapers conceding the victory to 
Adams.68
64 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
65 Although Jefferson was a leading contestant for the presidency in 1796, he “re-
mained at Monticello until the twentieth of February; then rode for Philadelphia, ar-
riving on March 2, 1797.” Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson 587 (1964). This 
means that he did not witness the vote-counting ritual in February. Indeed, Jefferson 
wrote a letter to Madison on January 30 with a Monticello dateline saying that he did 
not wish to come to Philadelphia even for the inauguration ceremonies in March (as-
serting that he need not attend). Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 
(Jan. 30, 1797), in 16 Madison Papers, supra note 5, at 479, 479. He evidently changed 
his mind later. There is no evidence that he was aware of Adams’s precedent. 
66 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 25, 1796), in 16 Madison 
Papers, supra note 5, at 435, 435.
67 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 16, 1797), in 16 Madison 
Papers, supra note 5, at 461, 461. 
68 In the December 21 edition of Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser, the Vermont 
votes were reported and a story with a Rutland dateline appeared stating that “[o]n 
Wednesday, the electors for the choice of a President and Vice-President of the 
United States, met in this town.—We are informed that all their votes were for the 
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Jefferson’s decision adds some useful complexity to our larger 
story. We have stressed how the Framers’ failure to anticipate the 
two-party system threatened to throw the constitutional system 
into a severe crisis. But Jefferson’s letter suggests that the survival 
of classical republican ideals—condemning faction, praising civic 
unity—tempered the very crisis that the Framers had failed to an-
ticipate. Both Adams and Jefferson were hardly political innocents, 
and they were perfectly prepared to compete for power in the new 
partisan environment. Nevertheless, they remained powerfully at-
tracted to the animating spirit of the Founding. When push came to 
shove, they sometimes—not always—managed to put these princi-
ples into practice in ways that softened the party assault on the 
non-party Constitution of 1787. 
Jefferson’s January 16 letter was one such instance.69 There can 
be no doubt that he was right: The country could ill afford “the 
phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president at so early a day.”70
Hon. JOHN ADAMS, and the Hon. THOMAS PINCKNEY, Esqrs.” Greenleaf’s 
New Daily Advertiser (New York), Dec. 21, 1796, at 3. On December 22, the Gazette 
of the United States and Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser both counted Vermont’s 
votes for the Federalists in their electoral vote chart. Gazette of the United States 
(Philadelphia), Dec. 22, 1796, at 3; Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), 
Dec. 22, 1796, at 3. The Aurora & General Advertiser from that day ran a story stating 
that “[f]rom good authority we are [unreadable word] that the Electors of the State of 
Vermont have voted for John Adams and Thomas Pinckney.” Aurora & General Ad-
vertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 22, 1796, at 2. The editions of the Gazette of the United 
States over the next two days counted the Vermont votes, and the same is true of the 
December 24, 1796, editions of the Columbian Centinel and Greenleaf’s New Daily 
Advertiser. Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Dec. 23, 1796, at 3; Gazette of 
the United States (Philadelphia), Dec. 24, 1796, at 3; Columbian Centinel (Boston), 
Dec. 24, 1796, at 2; Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), Dec. 24, 1796, at 
3.
69 In previous correspondence with Madison, Jefferson had already suggested an 
unwillingness to press partisanship too far in an effort to obtain the presidency. His 
letter of December 17 contemplated the possibility that some of Adams’s enemies in 
the Federalist party might seek to deprive Adams of the electoral votes that were 
rightly his, leading to a Jefferson-Adams dead-heat. Once again, Jefferson was ex-
plicit in his instructions: “I pray you and authorize you fully to solicit on my behalf 
that mr. Adams may be preferred. He has always been my senior from the com-
mencement of our public life, and the expression of the public will being equal, this 
circumstance ought to give him the preference.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
James Madison (Dec. 17, 1796), in 16 Madison Papers, supra note 5, at 431, 431–32. 
70 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 16, 1797), in 16 Madison 
Papers, supra note 5, at 461, 461. 
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We will return to this theme in discussing the main subject of this 
essay: Jefferson’s use of his power as Senate President to give him-
self a significant advantage in the Electoral College crisis of 1801. 
Before turning to this forgotten story, there is an additional lesson 
to be learned from our prelude. 
C. Vote-Counting Day in Philadelphia 
Without a doubt, most of the suspense had disappeared, but 
there was still a potential for intrigue on February 8, 1797, the day 
the votes were counted to pick the second President of the United 
States. Newspapers had ceased printing stories about the Vermont 
votes, but Adams and his supporters could not know for sure 
whether the Republicans were planning some last minute tricks. 
The stakes were enormous. If the Vermont electors had not been 
validly appointed, Adams would lose the state’s four votes and Jef-
ferson would become President by a margin of sixty-eight to sixty-
seven.71
The constitutional mathematics raised a strategic question for 
Adams: Would he provide his political enemies an explicit proce-
dural opportunity to raise the Vermont matter and its potentially 
devastating consequences? Or would he make it as hard as possible 
for the Republicans to mount a challenge? 
The Annals of Congress describes the proceedings: 
      The President of the Senate [John Adams] then thus ad-
dressed the two Houses: 
      Gentlemen of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives:
    By the report which has been made to me by the tellers ap-
pointed by the two Houses to examine the votes, there are 71 
votes for John Adams, 68 for Thomas Jefferson, 59 for Thomas 
Pinckney, 30 for Aaron Burr, 15 for Samuel Adams, 11 for Oliver 
Ellsworth, 7 for George Clinton, 5 for John Jay, 3 for James Ire-
dell, 2 for George Washington, 2 for John Henry, 2 for Samuel 
71 If Vermont’s 1791 electoral statute had lapsed, then it had not validly appointed 
its four 1796 Electors, leaving only 134 remaining in the pool. Under the Constitution, 
this meant that Jefferson’s sixty-eight votes were sufficient for him to prevail without 
a runoff. See supra note 50. 
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Johnston, and 1 for Charles C. Pinckney. The whole number of 
votes are 138; 70 votes, therefore, make a majority; so that the 
person who has 71 votes, which is the highest number, is elected 
President, and the person who has 68 votes, which is the next 
highest number, is elected Vice President. 
      The President of the Senate then sat down for a moment, and 
rising again, thus addressed the two Houses: 
      In obedience to the Constitution and Law of the United 
States, and to the commands of both Houses of Congress, ex-
pressed in their resolution passed in the present session, I declare 
that
      John Adams is elected President of the United States, for 
four years, to commence with the fourth day of March next; and 
that Thomas Jefferson is elected Vice President of the United 
States, for four years, to commence with the fourth day of March 
next.72
“The President of the Senate then sat down for a moment.” Four 
years earlier, Vice-President Adams had also presided over the 
vote count, but the Annals of Congress contains no similar nota-
tion.73 Indeed, no such pause is noted in any of the first fourteen 
presidential vote counts. It would seem, then, that Adams’s action 
72 6 Annals of Cong. 2097–98 (1797) (second emphasis added). Some of the accounts 
of vote-counting day in 1797 simply copy the Annals of Congress report that Adams 
sat for a moment. 2 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress 63 (Thomas Borden ed., 
New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857); Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 15 
(reporting proceedings of Feb. 8, 1797); McKnight, supra note 5, at 392; Presidential 
Counts, at xxii (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1877). Others are identical in sub-
stance to the Annals but provide abbreviated versions, leaving out various details.
These omit any mention of Adams’s momentary pause but do not contradict the fuller 
accounts. H. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 685–86 (1797); S. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 
(1797); Presidential Counts, supra, at 6, 9; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadel-
phia), Feb. 9, 1797, at 3. 
73 The various accounts of Adams’s conduct in 1793 are briefer than in 1797, and it is 
possible that Adams indeed sat for a moment but that this action was not recorded. 
Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 10–11; 3 Annals of Cong. 874–75 (1793); H. 
Jour., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 701–02 (1793); S. Jour., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 485–86 (1793); 1 
Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72, at 385–86; McKnight, supra 
note 5, at 390–91; Presidential Counts, supra note 72, at xxii, 3. No explicit mention, 
however, is made of such behavior. 
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was deliberate. Only one previous scholar has explicitly noted this 
incident: “Mr. Adams himself could certainly not raise the question 
of the validity of the Vermont votes; but he seems to have given an 
opportunity for objections if anyone should see fit to raise them.”74
A deflationary interpretation is available—perhaps Adams was 
only marking a transition between two phases of the proceeding, 
symbolizing that the vote count had concluded and the time had 
come for a final and authoritative declaration of the result. Yet this 
seems unlikely. Adams was no fool: By sitting down, he was put-
ting himself at the mercy of the Republican opposition in a close 
election.75 He would not have paused unless he harbored some 
doubts about his authority as President of the Senate to resolve 
disputed issues unilaterally. 
Thomas Jefferson would take a different view four years later. 
III. THE ELECTION OF 1800
When John Adams opened the documents from Vermont in 
1797, they were in perfect order. Thomas Jefferson faced a differ-
ent situation when he opened Georgia’s electoral votes in 1801: 
The certificate was illegal on its face. We begin by setting the prob-
lem in a larger context before focusing on Jefferson’s response. 
74 1 Stanwood, supra note 5, at 52.
75 There may also have been technical problems with the Kentucky electoral votes in 
1797. Several sources state that Adams announced that there was only one copy of 
Kentucky’s electoral votes. 6 Annals of Cong. 2096 (1797); 2 Abridgment of the De-
bates of Congress, supra note 72, at 62; Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 14–
15; McKnight, supra note 5, at 392. After inspection of the National Archives collec-
tion of electoral votes, it appears that there are, in fact, duplicate copies of the Ken-
tucky votes in the archives, but perhaps the duplicate was missing on vote-counting 
day in 1797. 
 There was also debate about events in Pennsylvania. Two Jefferson supporters 
may have been elected, but their returns were submitted late and two Federalists 
presented themselves as the legitimate electors. Letter from Joseph Jones to 
James Madison (Dec. 15, 1796), in 16 Madison Papers, supra note 5, at 428, 429 
n.1. In the end, it does not appear to have mattered all that much, as one of the 
two Federalist electors voted for Jefferson regardless. Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to T.M. Randolph (Jan. 9, 1797), in Jefferson Papers 17286–87, available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjser1.html (on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association).
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A. The Run-Up 
Washington’s delay in announcing his Farewell Address con-
strained the ferocity of party competition in 1796. With the Great 
Man departing the scene at the end of September, the two sides 
had little time to escalate their struggle to fever pitch. Four years 
later, partisan battle reached one of its historic highs.76
For both parties, the very future of the republic was at stake. For 
the Federalists, the Republicans were vicious factionalists who 
sought revolutionary upheaval along Jacobin lines.77 For the Re-
publicans, the Federalists were cryptomonarchists, aping English 
models at home and damaging the republican cause abroad.78 Both 
sides reacted with extreme measures that testified to their high 
anxiety. Republican politicians in Kentucky and Virginia issued 
resolutions calling for extraordinary state actions to check the 
abuse of Federalist power, while Federalist judges threw Republi-
can newspaper editors into jail for seditious libel.79
As the moment of electoral truth neared, the written Constitu-
tion failed to discharge its most basic function. Whatever else it 
may or may not accomplish, a written constitution is supposed to 
provide everyone with undisputable rules of the game—telling 
76 Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reap-
praisal, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 109, 111 (“With the exception of the Civil War and the pe-
riods immediately preceding and succeeding it[,] . . . America probably has not known 
a time when its politics were conducted with such vehemence and hatred.”). 
77 See, e.g., Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War 10–12, 28, 41 (1966). 
78 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Phillip Mazzei (Apr. 24, 1796), in 7 The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 72, 75–76 (Paul L. Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons 1896) (referring to the Federalists as an “Anglican[,] monarchical, & aristocrati-
cal party”). A North Carolina newspaper put it this way: 
Thomas Jefferson first drew the declaration of American independence;—he 
first framed the sacred political sentence that all men are born equal. John Ad-
ams says this is all a farce and a falsehood; that some men should be born Kings, 
and some should be born Nobles. Which of these, freemen of Pennsylvania, will 
you have for your President? Will you, by your votes, contribute to make the 
avowed friend of monarchy, President? —or will you, by neglectfully staying at 
home, permit others to saddle you with Political Slavery? Adams has Sons who 
might aim to succeed their father; Jefferson like Washington has no son. Adams 
is a fond admirer of the British Constitution, and says it is the first wonder of 
the world. Jefferson likes better our Federal Constitution, and thinks the British 
full of deformity, corruption and wickedness. Once more fellow citizens! 
Edenton State Gazette of North Carolina, Nov. 24, 1796.  
79 This familiar story is well summarized in Weisberger, supra note 40, at 200–24.
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them what they must do to win elections, and how to determine 
who has lost. When judged by this key criterion, the Philadelphia 
Convention was a miserable failure. 
The rise of two-party competition had transformed the Framers’ 
clever effort at institutional engineering into a constitutional 
nightmare. Failing to anticipate the rise of national parties, the 
Convention had focused on a different set of problems when de-
signing its system of presidential selection. In the Framers’ estima-
tion, their big problem was state provincialism, and so they had de-
veloped their complex two-vote scheme to mitigate its effects. 
Despite the impact of political parties on the election of 1796, the 
system managed to operate more or less as the Framers envisioned. 
With second votes scattering on behalf of regional favorites, the 
number-two spot went to Thomas Jefferson, leader of the Republi-
can party but also a “continental character” of the sort they wanted 
to guide the nation. 
As the 1800 race intensified, though, the electoral system be-
came the object of intense partisan manipulation. On the state 
level, parties used their political power to manipulate the process 
of selecting electors—shifting to legislative selection, or changing 
the mode of popular choice, depending on their perception of par-
tisan advantage.80 The Federalists attempted the same maneuver on 
the national level, where they were in firm control of the presi-
dency and both houses of Congress. Under the leadership of Fed-
eralist Senator James Ross, the Senate passed a bill establishing a 
special committee to “inquire, examine, decide, and report upon” 
irregularities that might occur in connection with the electoral 
vote.81 This “Grand Committee” was to include six senators, six 
representatives, and the Chief Justice of the United States.82 It was 
80 Tadahisa Kuroda, The Origins of the Twelfth Amendment 72–82 (1994). 
81 Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 18. Such irregularities included:  
the constitutional qualifications of the persons voted for as President and Vice-
President of the United States, upon the constitutional qualifications of the 
electors appointed by the different States, and whether their appointment was 
authorized by the State legislature or not; upon all petitions and exceptions 
against corrupt, illegal conduct of the electors, or force, menaces, or improper 
means used to influence their votes; or against the truth of their returns, or the 
time, place, or manner of giving their votes.  
Id. 
82 Id. at 17. 
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to meet in secret83 and its report would serve as the “final and con-
clusive determination of the admissibility or inadmissibility of the 
votes given by the electors for President and Vice-President of the 
United States.”84
Passed on a party-line vote of sixteen to twelve in March 1800, 
the bill would have become law but for Congressman John Mar-
shall’s intervention in the House. Speaking before a House select 
committee,85 Marshall raised constitutional objections to the pro-
posed bill.86 His amendments stripped the Committee of its authori-
tative status, giving the last word to both houses of Congress, meet-
ing separately. The Committee’s rejection of a state’s electoral vote 
would be upheld only if a majority of both houses accepted its rec-
ommendation.87 Marshall’s success in weakening the proposal an-
gered the more extreme Federalists. His measure passed the House 
but was rejected on another party-line vote in the Senate—with 
hard-line Federalists insisting that a Committee rejection be up-
held if only one house supported its recommendation.88 This de-
mand led to an impasse, and the Ross initiative came to nothing, 
leaving the President of the Senate and Congress to confront the 
painfully inadequate constitutional text if a vote-counting problem 
should arise.89
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 18. 
85 10 Annals of Cong. 670, 674 (1800). 
86 See 2 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 453–57 (1916). 
87 10 Annals of Cong. 670, 674; see Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 24; 
Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 19, 1800, at 2 (reprinting the bill’s 
text in full).
88 See 2 Beveridge, supra note 86, at 456; Kuroda, supra note 80, at 80–82. 
89 As sitting Vice-President, Jefferson was, of course, an interested observer, and 
was unimpressed by Marshall’s efforts to control the Grand Committee: 
[T]he bill for the election of the Pres and V P has undergone much revolution. 
Marshall made a dexterous manoeuver; he declares against the constitutionality 
of the Senate’s bill, and proposes that the right of decision of their grand com-
mittee should be controllable by the concurrent vote of the two Houses of con-
gress; but to stand good if not rejected by a concurrent vote. You will readily es-
timate the amount of this sort of controul. The committee of the H. of R., 
however, took from the Committee the right of giving any opinion, requiring 
them to report facts only, and that the votes returned by the states should be 
counted, unless reported by a concurrent vote of both Houses. In what form 
they will pass them or us, cannot be foreseen. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Apr. 30, 1800) in Jefferson Pa-
pers 18274, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjser1.html (on file 
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This ticking time-bomb was momentarily forgotten once the 
electoral returns started rolling in. In contrast to 1796, electors had 
sworn off the practice of substituting a favorite son for their party’s 
vice-presidential candidate. With four years of battle under their 
belts, every elector voted a straight party-line ticket, with one ex-
ception. The Federalists wasted one of their second ballots on John 
Jay, giving John Adams a one-vote edge over his running mate 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and neatly avoiding a House runoff 
if they won a majority.
The Republicans were less astute. All of their electors voted a 
straight ticket, giving Jefferson and Burr an equal number of votes 
and throwing the race into the House. “[A]fter the most energetic 
efforts, crowned with success, we remain in the hands of our ene-
mies by want of foresight in the original arrangement”90—so wrote 
Jefferson to Monroe on December 20. 
Almost two months remained before the day designated for the 
formal vote count, Wednesday, February 11, 1801.91 This was a pe-
riod of feverish activity, as Republicans and Federalists prepared 
their forces for the looming House runoff between Jefferson and 
Burr. If the protagonists had been aware of a problem with Geor-
gia’s electoral votes, they would have engaged in a related round of 
strategic maneuvering. Without Georgia’s four electors, Jefferson 
and Burr could only claim sixty-nine valid votes apiece. As we have 
explained,92 this would have forced them into a five-man runoff 
that included Adams, Pinckney, and Jay.93 The possibility of a five-
man race should have provoked an intense round of politicking—
and yet we have found absolutely no documentary evidence of any 
such activity. In contrast, there is voluminous evidence detailing ef-
forts by Federalist and Republican politicians to gain support from 
with the Virginia Law Review Association). Jefferson seems to have misread Mar-
shall’s bill, which required both houses to uphold the Committee’s decision before a 
full rejection could occur. Jefferson asserts that the Committee’s decision would be 
valid unless both houses affirmatively rejected their findings.
90 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Dec. 20, 1800), quoted in
Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty 496 (1962). This letter can 
be found at the Library of Congress, Jefferson Papers 18511 (available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjser1.html). 
91 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 5, 1 Stat. 239, 240. 
92 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
93 Id.
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House members in the two-man race between Jefferson and Burr 
they believed was in the offing.94 The silence about the five-man 
possibility is deafening—no one seems to have anticipated the con-
stitutional pitfalls awaiting Jefferson when he opened the ballots 
on February 11. 
Our conclusion is bolstered by Jefferson’s confident treatment of 
an administrative matter. To ensure that all the electoral votes ar-
rived in Washington in time, the governing statutes authorized the 
Secretary of State, then John Marshall, to “send a special messen-
ger” if any state’s electoral certificates had not arrived by the “first 
Wednesday in January.”95
The states were sending envelopes containing their ballots to 
Jefferson, in his capacity as President of the Senate.96 On Decem-
ber 28, he wrote Marshall that no special messengers would be re-
quired.97 Jefferson’s confidence was perfectly understandable—as 
we will see, the outside of the envelope from Georgia bears no in-
dication of the constitutional problems contained within.98 More-
over, it was perfectly understandable that Jefferson would go no 
further than the surface of the envelope, as the Constitution explic-
itly required him to “open all the Certificates” in full view of the 
House and Senate,99 and he would have raised suspicions about bal-
lot-tampering had he taken a peek beforehand. 
The emerging situation was the mirror image of the Vermont 
scenario of 1797. The complaints about Vermont were raised in the 
newspapers long before Adams opened the envelopes.100 This gave 
the sitting Vice-President an opportunity to consider in advance 
how to conduct himself at the moment of truth. The potential legal 
94 Professor Ackerman recounts their scheming at length in a forthcoming book. See 
Ackerman, supra note 41, at 60–132.
95 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 4, 1 Stat. 239, 240. (empowering the Secretary of 
State to send a messenger to a state only if “a list of votes” had not been received by 
the first Wednesday in January).
96 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
97 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Marshall (Dec. 28, 1800), in 6 The Papers 
of John Marshall 45, 45–46 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1990) (“I have the honor to 
inform you that a list of the votes for President & Vice-president of the US. has come 
to my hands from every state of the union; and consequently that no special messen-
ger to any of them need be provided by the department of state.”).
98 See infra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
99 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
100 See supra note 54. 
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difficulty was made easier by the fact that the Vermont ballot was 
formally perfect.101 And strategically, the stakes had been lowered 
dramatically when, thanks to Jefferson’s behind-the-scenes inter-
vention, the Republicans were no longer publicly complaining 
about the legality of the Vermont votes. When Adams provided his 
political enemies with a formal opportunity to protest at the vote-
counting ritual, he could be quite confident that his enemies would 
not exploit the situation, and if they did, that he could legally jus-
tify a decision to place the Vermont votes in his column. 
Things were different in 1801. When the obvious defect in Geor-
gia’s ballot became evident on February 11, everybody would be in 
for a surprise, and high-stakes decisions would be required in a 
matter of minutes. Worse yet, the written Constitution served only 
to exacerbate the explosive situation. Rather than providing clear 
rules for resolving electoral vote problems, it explicitly handed the 
gavel to the worst possible presiding officer—the man with the 
most to gain by including Georgia’s defective ballot—and failed to 
provide him with any rules to govern the tough cases. 
B. Jefferson’s Problem 
Whatever its other obscurities, Article II of the Constitution 
contains some plain instructions for each state’s electors: “And 
they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the 
Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, 
and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate.”102 Call this the elec-
toral vote, and it is the document that created legal problems for 
Georgia in 1800. 
A few statutory requirements are also relevant. George Wash-
ington’s first election preceded the first session of Congress, but in 
1792 Congress enacted a framework law for future contests. The 
statute instructs the “executive authority of each state” to create a 
second document that certifies the names of the electors who have 
been selected by the state.103 Call this the certificate of ascertain-
ment. The statute instructs the electors to enclose this certificate 
101 Of course, Adams could not have known this in advance. 
102 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
103 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 3, 1 Stat. 239, 240.
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with their electoral vote.104 Once they have placed both documents 
in an envelope for delivery to the President of the Senate, they 
must also “certify[]” on the envelope “that a list of the votes of 
such state for President and Vice President is contained therein.”105
The Georgia electors fulfilled both of these statutory require-
ments in 1801, but their electoral vote—the key document required 
by the Constitution—dramatically fails to comply with the re-
quirements of Article II and the norms established by the uniform 
practice of the states in every early election.106 In 1796, for example, 
this is what Georgia’s vote looked like:107
104 Id. 
105 Id. § 2. A further detail: The electors are actually instructed to create three copies 
of the relevant documents, and place them in three separate envelopes containing 
three superscriptions. One set is personally delivered and one is mailed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate; the third goes to a local federal district judge for safekeeping. Id. 
§ 2. Likewise, the state executive is instructed to prepare three copies of the certifi-
cate of ascertainment, one copy to be included in each set of electoral documents pre-
pared by the electors. Id. § 3. 
106 We have inspected every vote certificate submitted by the state Electors in the 
course of the first six elections. With the exception of Georgia’s in 1800, each is in 
perfect order. At our request, the Library of Congress has prepared a microform of 
these early electoral votes. See Electoral Vote Records, Film. No. 189 (on file with 
the Yale Law Library) [hereinafter “Electoral Vote Records”].
 The first election, held in 1788, preceded the first session of Congress as well as the 
Act of 1792. New Hampshire submitted only the letter from the Electors required by 
Article II, with no letter from any “executive authority” as would have been required 
by the Act of 1792. Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 3, 1 Stat. 239, 240. Two states (Geor-
gia and Maryland) did not send two copies of each item to the Capitol, as would later 
be required by the Act of 1792. Id. § 2. But in all other respects, the state documents 
fully comply with the rules laid down in the subsequent statute.
107 For those who find the script difficult to decipher, this document states that the 
Electors (whose four names appear below) met at a “place directed for the Electors 
to meet for the Election of President” and that “We the underwritten Electors do cer-
tify the above [four votes for Jefferson and four votes for George Clinton] to be a 
true” list of their votes.
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Figure 1 
As the Constitution prescribes, the upper half of the document 
contains “a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of 
Votes for each.”108 The bottom half complies with the second part 
of the constitutional command: “which List they shall sign and cer-
tify.”109 Georgia’s 1796 submission also contains a certificate of as-
108 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
109 Id. 
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certainment from the Governor certifying the four electors whose 
signatures appear on the electoral vote.110
In contrast, Georgia’s envelope of 1800 contains a single sheet of 
paper, not the two provided by every other state. On one side of 
the sheet, there is a legally perfect certificate of ascertainment, 
signed by Governor James Jackson, identifying the state’s four 
electors in the standard fashion. There is, however, no physically 
distinct electoral vote. The only indication of the electors’ prefer-
ences appears on the obverse side of the certificate of ascertain-
ment. This is what it looks like: 
110 We have inspected the original documents at the National Archives in Washing-
ton, D.C. 
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Figure 2 
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 To what extent does this primitive document satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements? If we restrict ourselves to the four corners of 
the document, the answer is: not at all. To be sure, there is a “list” 
of four names under the headings “Jefferson” and “Burr,” but 
there is no statement certifying that the four individuals were cast-
ing the state’s electoral votes for these two candidates. 
To clarify the formal deficiencies, simply measure the Georgia 
“vote” against the terms of the constitutional text. The Georgia 
document indeed contains a “List,”111 but it does not say that it 
represents a list of “the Persons voted for.”112 The four names ap-
pearing below “Jefferson” and “Burr” are those of the individuals 
certified by Governor Jackson, but the electors themselves have 
not “sign[ed] and certif[ied]” that the list actually represents a true 
statement of their preferences.113
These constitutional requirements are purely technical, but they 
are not trivial. To the contrary, when read as part of the grander 
constitutional scheme, they seem quite important. Immediately af-
ter the Constitution imposes elaborate formalisms on each state’s 
electoral vote, it proceeds to a provision that should, by now, be 
familiar: “The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, 
and the Votes shall then be counted.”114
Given the opacity of this provision, formalism might be just the 
thing needed to ensure its smooth operation. Since the text does 
not explicitly contemplate complex disputes over the validity of 
electoral votes, perhaps the best way to make it operational is to 
impose a crisp rule on the President of the Senate. When opening 
each ballot, he should assure himself that the voting papers comply 
111 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
112 Id. 
113 In the language of Article II and the Act of 1792, the “sign, certify, and transmit” 
language is modified by the pronoun “they,” clearly referring to the electors. U.S. 
Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (stating that “they [the electors] shall sign and certify, and 
transmit” the electoral votes) (emphasis added); Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 2, 1 
Stat. 239, 239–40 (stating that the electors “shall make and sign three certificates of all 
the votes by them given, and [the electors] shall seal up the same certifying on each 
that a list of the votes of such state for President and Vice President is contained 
therein”). This makes perfect practical sense—would the Framers or the authors of 
the 1792 Act have wanted the electors to draft and certify part of the package and 
have some unnamed other complete the process?
114 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
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with the formal constitutional and statutory requirements. If they 
do, the vote “shall then be counted;”115 if not, it should not. Any 
other approach threatens to involve the President of the Senate in 
an uncertain proceeding in which he might be an interested party. 
The formalist’s premise of a smoothly functioning machine, more-
over, was regularly fulfilled during the early years of the republic: 
Each state in every prior election had submitted technically perfect 
electoral votes and certificates of ascertainment.116
Yet formalism has the vices of its virtues: The disqualification of 
an entire state is a very serious matter. In 1800, Georgia was a fron-
tier region without great legal sophistication.117 If the Georgians 
had merely made a technical error in expressing their choice of Jef-
ferson and Burr, would it not be wrong to disqualify them? Worse 
yet, the blunder had decisive national ramifications, transforming a 
two-man House runoff into a five-man race. Why should the na-
tion’s fate hinge on some backwoods blunder? 
But was the mistake merely technical? 
Viewing the matter from Washington, D.C., it would have been 
hard to know for sure. First of all, no other frontier state had ever 
made such a legal mistake. Tennessee, for example, had a much 
shorter history of organized government than did Georgia, but it 
had had no trouble complying with the explicit commands of the 
Constitution and the 1792 Act. Here is Tennessee’s 1800 ballot:118
115 Id. 
116 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
117 See infra note 120 and sources cited therein. 
118 This document states that: 
Pursuant to [their] duty as Electors for the State of Tennessee, having convened 
in Knoxville on the first Wednesday of December in the year [one thousand] 
eight hundred and being legally qualified, we do certify that we voted by ballot 
for President and Vice President of the United States. And upon counting, the 
votes they were as follows [three for Jefferson and three for Burr]. 
The signatures of the electors appear below this statement. Electoral Vote Records, 
supra note 106.
ACKERMANPRE1ST 3/18/04 7:34 PM 
594 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:551
Figure 3 
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Not only did Georgia’s ballot stick out like a sore thumb, but 
there was something particularly suspicious about it: Its electoral 
vote had been plastered on the backside of the certificate of ascer-
tainment. This anomaly raises the disturbing possibility of a classic 
“bait and switch” operation. Under this scenario, Georgia’s four 
electors actually did what everybody else did: They prepared a 
proper ballot, put it into the envelope with the certificate of ascer-
tainment, and then signed the outside of the envelope.119 At this 
point, some devious character enters the scene, removes the stan-
dard ballot, and casts four defective votes for Jefferson and Burr 
on the backside of the remaining certificate. He then seals the en-
velope and sends it on its merry way. 
The missing electoral document was not only suspicious in itself. 
The “bait and switch” scenario put the legal deficiencies of the er-
satz ballot in a new and disturbing light. Criminals do not spend 
much time reading the Constitution. If a fraudster had removed the 
genuine ballot prepared by the true electors, it is not surprising 
that he created a legal mess when writing up his counterfeit. On 
this scenario, Georgia’s legal mess was the result of a fraudster’s 
elimination of the genuine item originally prepared by the true 
electors.
Worse yet, Georgia was already notorious for shady dealing. In 
the Yazoo scandals, the state’s leading politicians had sold vast 
tracts of public land at ridiculously low prices: “[O]nly one of the 
legislators voting for [the Yazoo act] had not been bribed in some 
way by the land companies.”120 To be sure, Georgia’s voters had re-
119 The text is simplifying in one particular. Remember that the statute required the 
preparation of three sets of documents—two to be delivered to the President of the 
Senate and one to a local federal district judge. See supra note 105. 
120 C. Peter McGrath, Yazoo 7 (1966). Georgia was very much a frontier state at the 
time, without a great deal of legal talent. See generally W.W. Abbot, The Royal Gov-
ernors of Georgia: 1754–1775 (1959); T.S. Arthur & W.H. Carpenter, The History of 
Georgia, from Its Earliest Settlement to the Present Time (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 
Grambo & Co. 1852); Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia: 
1763–1789 (1958); James F. Cook, The Governors of Georgia: 1754–1995 (1995); 2 
Walter G. Cooper, The Story of Georgia (1938); 1 Warren Grice, Georgia Through 
Two Centuries (E. Merton Coulter ed., 1966); Amanda Johnson, Georgia as Colony 
and State (1938); 2 Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History of Georgia (Cambridge, The 
Riverside Press 1883); Spencer B. King, Jr., Georgia Voices: A Documentary History 
to 1872 (1966); Albert B. Saye, New Viewpoints in Georgia History 1732–1789 (1943); 
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cently swept the corrupt politicos out of office,121 but could Jeffer-
son, sitting from a great distance in Washington, D.C., be confident 
that their replacements were not playing similar games? 
So much for the dark side. There were other bits of concrete 
evidence that pointed in a more reassuring direction. Pursuant to 
statutory instructions, Georgia’s four electors had “certif[ied]” on their 
envelope to the President of the Senate “that a list of the votes . . . for 
President and Vice President [was] contained therein.”122 As Figure 4 
suggests, these four signatures match quite well with their name-
sakes on the defective ballot illustrated in Figure 2: 
George Gillman Smith, The Story of Georgia and the Georgia People: 1732 to 1860 
(1900).
121 McGrath, supra note 120, passim. 
122 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Stat. 239, 239–40.
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Figure 4 
The history of mankind is littered with clever forgeries, and even 
today, handwriting analysis is more art than science. Nevertheless, 
if Jefferson were to compare the ballot with the envelope, he 
would not detect evidence of an obvious forgery. So perhaps the 
ACKERMANPRE1ST 3/18/04 7:34 PM 
598 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:551
unconstitutional Georgia ballot was indeed the result of mere legal 
incompetence rather than gross skullduggery. 
 This benign interpretation is supported by a final consideration. 
All through January, newspapers were reporting regularly that Jef-
ferson and Burr had won all four of Georgia’s electoral votes.123
Given the broad publicity, surely the Federalists would have 
launched a vocal protest if they thought they had really won. The 
election of 1800 was one of the closest, and most partisan, in 
American history. If any of the Georgia electors had actually voted 
123 There were five newspapers in Georgia at the time (the Augusta Chronicle, the 
Augusta Herald, the Columbian Museum & Savannah Advertiser, the Georgia Ga-
zette, and the Louisville Gazette, the last of which became the Louisville Gazette & 
Republican Trumpet in April 1800), and we examined every edition of all five span-
ning the period of January 1800 to February 1801. We also examined editions of every 
newspaper in print anywhere in the country over the period of January to March 
1801, as well as every edition of the Gazette of the United States published in 1800.  
 Our conclusion: In the months leading up to the election, there was some uncer-
tainty about the ultimate result, but as election day neared, the reports consistently 
indicated that Georgia would vote for Jefferson and Burr. On May 9, the Columbian 
Museum & Savannah Advertiser reported that Georgia would give four votes to 
Thomas Jefferson and four votes to Charles Pinckney in the upcoming election. Co-
lumbian Museum & Savannah Advertiser, May 9, 1800, at 2. On July 22, by contrast, 
the same publication reported that Georgia would give four votes each to Thomas 
Jefferson and Aaron Burr without explanation. Columbian Museum & Savannah Ad-
vertiser, July 22, 1800, at 3. On November 8, 1800, the Augusta Herald reported that 
Georgia would give four votes to Jefferson, while on November 11, 1800, the Gazette 
of the United States reported that Georgia would give two votes to Jefferson, two 
votes to Burr, two votes to Adams, and two votes to Pinckney, citing the “Columbian 
Mirror” as its source for the report. Augusta Herald, Nov. 8, 1800, at 2; Gazette of the 
United States (Philadelphia), Nov. 11, 1800. Four days later, the Gazette reported that 
Jefferson would receive four votes and that four votes would be “scattering.” Gazette 
of the United States (Philadelphia), Nov. 15, 1800, at 3. 
 But by November 19, the Louisville Gazette & Republican Trumpet reported that 
“it is now reduced to a certainty, that Mr. Jefferson will get the four votes of this 
State, for president,” before repeating the names of the four electors the state legisla-
ture apparently picked originally: Morrison, Smelt, Graybill, and Lumpkin. Louisville 
Gazette & Republican Trumpet, Nov. 19, 1800, at 3. The Augusta Herald edition for 
November 26 repeated this information. Augusta Herald, Nov. 26, 1800, at 3. In its 
December 10 edition, the Augusta Herald discussed how each state had voted in the 
presidential election, and reported that Georgia had voted for Jefferson. Augusta 
Herald, Dec. 10, 1800, at 3. The same day, the Louisville Gazette & Republican 
Trumpet reported that “the State of Georgia w[ill] furnish four votes for Jefferson.” 
Louisville Gazette & Republican Trumpet, Dec. 10, 1800, at 1. On December 26, the 
Gazette of the United States reported that the “Electors of President and Vice-
President in the State . . . [of] Georgia, have given a unanimous vote for Mr. Jefferson 
and Mr. Burr.” Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Dec. 26, 1800, at 3. 
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for Adams or Pinckney, common sense suggests that they never 
would have remained silent as they saw their votes publicly misrep-
resented. Once the Georgia envelope was opened, clever lawyers 
might debate endlessly about the possibility of a “bait and switch” 
operation, yet for the sober statesman, the public silence in the pe-
riod leading up to February 11 might seem more eloquent than 
anything lawyers might say afterward. 
This final point seems the most powerful argument supporting a 
decision to credit Jefferson and Burr with Georgia’s four electoral 
votes in 1801. But is it sufficiently powerful to outweigh all the ar-
guments on the other side? 
This was the key question facing Jefferson as he confronted his 
constitutional responsibilities as Senate President. How did he re-
spond?
C. Jefferson’s Decision 
A glance at the official report of the vote count in the Annals of 
Congress is not the slightest bit revealing: 
      Mr. SPEAKER, attended by the House, then went into the 
Senate Chamber, and took seats therein, when both Houses be-
ing assembled, Mr. RUTLEDGE and Mr. NICHOLAS, the tellers on 
the part of this House, together with Mr. WELLS, the teller on 
the part of the Senate, took seats at a table provided for them, in 
the front of the President of the Senate. 
      The PRESIDENT of the Senate, in the presence of both 
Houses, proceeded to open the certificates of the Electors of the 
several States, beginning with the State of New Hampshire; and 
as the votes were read, the tellers on the part of each house, 
counted and took lists of the same, which, being compared, were 
delivered to the President of the Senate, and are as follows: 
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New Hampshire -          -          - – – 6 6  
Massachusetts  -          -          - – – 16 16  
Rhode Island    -          -          - – – 4 3 1 
Connecticut       -          -          - – – 9 9  
Vermont             -          -          - – – 4 4  
New York          -          -          - 12 12    
New Jersey  -          -          - – – 7 7  
Pennsylvania  -          -          - 8 8 7 7  
Delaware   -          -          - – – 3 3  
Maryland   -          -          - 5 5 5 5  
Virginia  -          -          - 21 21    
Kentucky  -          -          - 4 4    
North Carolina  -          -          - 8 8 4 4  
Tennessee   -          -          - 3 3    
South Carolina  -          -          - 8 8    
Georgia  -          -          - 4 4    
73 73 65 64 1 
Recapitulation of the votes of the Electors. 
Thomas Jefferson - - - - 73 
Aaron Burr - - - - - 73 
John Adams - - - - - 65 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney  - - 64 
John Jay - - - - -   1 
      The PRESIDENT of the Senate, in pursuance of the duty en-
joined upon him, announced the state of the votes to both 
Houses, and declared that THOMAS JEFFERSON, of Virginia, and 
AARON BURR, of New York, having the greatest number, and a 
majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, and, being 
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equal, it remained for the House of Representatives to determine 
the choice. 
      The two Houses then separated; and the House of Represen-
tatives, being returned to their Chamber, proceeded, in the man-
ner prescribed by the Constitution, to the choice of a President of 
the United States . . . .124
There is no indication of a problem with the Georgia ballot. In 
contrast to John Adams in 1797, Jefferson does not sit down after 
the vote count to give others a chance to raise an objection.125 He 
immediately pushes the proceedings to the next stage: a House 
runoff between Burr and himself for the presidency. So far as the 
Annals and all of the other official versions are concerned, there 
was no problem with the Georgia vote. 
The newspapers tell a different story. Here is the account from 
the Philadelphia Aurora & General Advertiser: “The Tellers de-
clared there was some informality in the votes of Georgia, but be-
lieving them to be the true votes, reported them as such.”126 The 
Aurora was the leading Republican paper of the time, noteworthy 
for its partisanship in a partisan age.127 Since its story cast a shadow 
(however slight) on Jefferson’s claim to an Electoral College ma-
jority, it certainly would not have fabricated the incident out of 
whole cloth. 
The Aurora’s report was copied verbatim in Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia, and even Savannah, by newspapers of every political 
leaning.128 At least one other paper—Boston’s Mercury and New-
124 10 Annals of Cong. 1023–24 (1801). 
125 None of the reports of Jefferson’s actions from that day indicate that he paused 
or sat down. Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 30–31, 33; 10 Annals of Cong. 
1023 (1801); H. Jour., 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 796–99 (1801); S. Jour., 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 
124–25 (1801); 2 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72, at 531; 
McKnight, supra note 5, at 393; Presidential Counts, supra note 72, at xxii, 11, 16. 
126 Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 11, 1801, at 2. 
127 Fischer, supra note 54, at 419 (identifying the Aurora as a “decidedly Republi-
can” newspaper). 
128 Columbian Centinel (Boston), Feb. 21, 1801, at 2; Columbian Museum & Savan-
nah Advertiser, Feb. 27, 1801, at 3; Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), Feb. 18, 
1801, at 2; Philadelphia Gazette & Daily Advertiser, Feb. 14, 1801, at 3; Spectator 
(New York), Feb. 18, 1801, at 3. The Centinel and The Philadelphia Gazette & Daily 
Advertiser were “decidedly Federalist,” Fischer, supra note 54, at 414, 419. The Spec-
tator and the Pennsylvania Gazette were “moderately Federalist.” Id. at 417, 419. The 
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England Palladium—published a story that varied the language 
slightly: “The votes from Georgia, were rather informal—but ac-
cepted.”129 To further enhance verisimilitude, all the newspapers 
put a precise time on their report: “half past 3 o’clock, p.m.”130
No newspaper explicitly described Jefferson’s role in the affair. 
Those following the Aurora flashed a searchlight on the “tellers.” 
It was these gentlemen, two from the House and one from the Sen-
ate, who “declared [that] there was some informality . . . but believ-
ing them to be the true votes, reported them as such.”131
As a constitutional matter, however, the tellers lacked the au-
thority to make a binding decision. Article II does not mention 
their existence, let alone vest them with any decisionmaking au-
thority.132 Moreover, the official proceedings did not give the last 
word to the tellers, but to Jefferson: 
      The PRESIDENT of the Senate, in pursuance of the duty en-
joined upon him, announced the state of the votes to both 
Houses, and declared that THOMAS JEFFERSON, of Virginia, and 
AARON BURR, of New York, having the greatest number, and a 
majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, and, being 
equal, it remained for the House of Representatives to determine 
the choice.133
Columbian Museum and Savannah Advertiser was “very moderately Federalist.” Id. 
at 422. Again, the Aurora was “decidedly Republican.” Id. at 419. 
129 Mercury & New-England Palladium (Boston), Feb. 24, 1801, at 2. 
130 See supra notes 127–28. 
131 See supra notes 126, 128. 
132 A bill introduced on February 14, 1800, attempted to define the duties of the tell-
ers, granting them strictly ministerial authority: 
[T]o receive the certificates of the Electors from the President of the Senate, af-
ter they shall have been opened and read, and to note in writing, the dates of 
the certificates, the names of the Electors, the time and place of their meeting, 
the number of votes given, and the names of the persons voted for; and also, the 
substance of the certificates from the Executive authority of each state, accom-
panying the certificates of the Electors . . . . 
A Bill Prescribing the mode of deciding disputed elections of President and Vice 
President of the United States, S., 6th Cong. (1800), microformed on 6th Congress, 
1799–1801: Senate Bills (Library of Congress). For reference to the date of introduc-
tion, see Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 16; S. Jour., 6th Cong., 1st Sess., 
23, 31 (1800). In any event, it failed to pass Congress. Kuroda, supra note 80, at 78–82.
133 10 Annals of Cong. 1024 (1801) (emphasis added). 
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We are now in a position to present a stripped-down version of our 
story:  
 Strong evidence demonstrates that the tellers told Jefferson (ap-
parently loud enough for the news to get out to the public134) that 
there was a problem with the Georgia vote. Our inspection of the 
original documents tells us that they were right. Nevertheless, Jeffer-
son asserted his authority, as President of the Senate, to proceed in 
the face of this report. He decisively resolved the issue by counting 
Georgia’s vote as part of the final tally, even though he was an inter-
ested party in the affair. Despite the extraordinary character of this 
action, nobody rose to protest.135
If we limit ourselves to strictly contemporaneous sources, this is 
all we are entitled to say—more than enough, as we shall see, to 
raise a host of historiographic and constitutional issues. Before 
broadening the inquiry, we trace the remarkable fate of this inci-
dent in American history. After all, it is no small thing to learn that 
Thomas Jefferson counted his rivals out of the race in the House 
runoff for the presidency. This remarkable fact, however, has 
somehow eluded the devoted attentions of generations of Jefferson 
lovers and Jefferson haters.136 And it would have eluded our atten-
134 McKnight describes the likely behavior of the tellers: “We all know that the cus-
tom of the tellers at a meeting is for one to count out aloud the votes as they are given 
and for the others to record them; this is undoubtedly what they did here on this ex-
traordinary and unique occasion.” McKnight, supra note 5, at 292. Other sources also 
indicate that the tellers read the votes aloud. The analytical introduction to Presiden-
tial Counts states that “[i]n practice, the tellers have read the votes, one by one, after 
they have been opened or the seals sometimes broken, sometimes unbroken, by the 
presiding officer, or in some instances the packages with unbroken seals handed over 
by the presiding officer.” Presidential Counts, supra note 72, at xiii. 
135 These conclusions about the order of events are based on an extensive review of 
all available accounts of vote-counting day from the first election up through that of 
1840, including (1) Annals of Congress (vote-counting day from 1789–1821); (2) Jour-
nal of the House of Representatives (vote-counting day from 1789–1817); (3) Journal 
of the Senate (vote-counting day from 1789–1817); (4) Abridgment of the Debates of 
Congress (vote-counting day from 1789–1801 and 1809–1841); (5) Gales & Seaton’s 
Register of Debates in Congress (vote-counting day from 1825–1833); and (6) Count-
ing Electoral Votes (vote-counting day from 1789–1841). Our survey extended to 
various secondary sources, including Dougherty, supra note 5; McKnight, supra note 
5; Stanwood, supra note 5; and Presidential Counts, supra note 72. 
136 See, e.g., John W. Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 3 Pol. Sci. Q. 633 
(1888); C.C. Tansill, supra note 5. There is only one scholar whose writing suggests 
that he may have examined the actual electoral documents in the National Archives. 
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tion as well, except for the serendipitous discovery of a remarkable 
book by Matthew Livingston Davis.137 Written in 1836, Davis’s two-
volume Memoirs of Aaron Burr contains a graphic description of 
the scene:
      On the 11th of February the ballots were opened. During the 
performance of this ceremony a most extraordinary incident oc-
curred. As it is known to but few now living, and never been pub-
licly spoken of, it has been deemed proper to record it here, as a 
part of the history of that exciting contest. 
 The Aurora of the 16th of February, 1801, remarks, that “the 
tellers declared that there was some informality in the votes of 
Georgia; but, believing them to be true votes, reported them as 
such.” No explanation of the nature of this informality was given; 
nor is it known that any has ever been given since. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Mr. Jefferson was the presiding officer. On opening the 
package [of] endorsed Georgia votes, it was discovered to be to-
tally irregular. The statement now about to be given is derived 
from an honourable gentleman, a member of Congress from the 
state of New-York during the administration of Mr. Jefferson, 
and yet living in this state. He says that Mr. Wells (a teller on the 
part of the Senate) informed him that the envelope was blank; 
He does not, however, mention the legal problems with the Georgia vote, perhaps be-
cause he is not a lawyer. Kuroda, supra note 80, at 202 n.48 (1994) (including a cita-
tion to the actual Georgia electoral votes of 1800). None of the biographies of Jeffer-
son or studies of the 1800 presidential election mentions the February 11 incident. We 
searched a multitude of Jefferson biographies available at the Library of Congress, 
and none of them contain any references to the incident. See, e.g., Joyce Appleby, 
Thomas Jefferson (2003); Alen Axelrod, Life and Work of Thomas Jefferson (2001); 
Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (1996); Dumas 
Malone, Jefferson and His Time (1948); Dumas Malone, Thomas Jefferson as Politi-
cal Leader (1963); Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson: A Biography (1951); Weis-
berger, supra note 40. 
137 Not entirely serendipitous: Professor Ackerman was preparing to write a book on 
the constitutional implications of the Jeffersonian “Revolution of 1800,” and was sys-
tematically researching the biographies of the leading protagonists in the struggle. See 
Ackerman, supra note 41. There are lots of biographies of lots of protagonists, how-
ever, and it would have been easy to have missed the reference in a single tome. 
ACKERMANPRE1ST 3/18/04 7:34 PM 
2004] Thomas Jefferson 605
that the return of the votes was not authenticated by the signa-
tures of the electors, or any of them, either on the outside or the in-
side of the envelope, or in any other manner; that it merely stated 
in the inside that the votes of Georgia were, for Thomas Jeffer-
son four, and for Aaron Burr four, without the signature of any 
person whatsoever. Mr. Wells added, that he was very undecided 
as to the proper course to be pursued by the tellers. It was, how-
ever, suggested by one of them that the paper should be handed 
to the presiding officer, without any statement from the tellers 
except that the return was informal; that he consented to this ar-
rangement under the firm conviction that Mr. Jefferson would 
announce the nature of the informality from the chair; but, to his 
utmost surprise, he (Mr. Jefferson) rapidly declared that the 
votes of Georgia were four for Thomas Jefferson and four for 
Aaron Burr, without noticing their informality, and in a hurried 
manner put them aside, and then broke the seals and handed to 
the tellers the package from the next state. Mr. Wells observed, 
that as soon as Mr. Jefferson looked at the paper purporting to 
contain a statement of the electoral vote of the state of Georgia, 
his countenance changed, but that the decision and promptitude 
with which he acted on that occasion convinced him of that 
which he (a federalist) and his party had always doubted, that is 
to say, Mr. Jefferson’s decision of character, at least when his 
own interest was at hazard.138
How much weight should be given to this astonishing account? 
On its face, it is double hearsay. Davis heard the account from 
an anonymous New York Congressman who had heard it from 
Wells. There were three tellers at the proceedings: Federalist Wil-
liam Wells from the Senate, Federalist John Rutledge, and Repub-
lican John Nicholas from the House. Our search of the principal 
archives containing Davis’s papers, and those of the tellers, has 
failed to uncover further corroboration.139 Worse yet, Davis was a 
138 2 Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of Aaron Burr with Miscellaneous Selections from 
His Correspondence 71–73 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1836). 
139 Senator Wells’s papers are located at the Historical Society of Delaware in Wil-
mington, Delaware and at the University of Pennsylvania. Representative Nicholas’s 
papers are located at Columbia University, the Library of Congress, and the Univer-
sity of Virginia. Representative Rutledge’s papers are located at Duke University, the 
Library of Congress, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. See also 
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long-time Burr loyalist and an active and life-long Jefferson-
hater.140 During his moderately successful career in New York poli-
tics, he certainly did not have a standout reputation for integrity.141
When publishing a posthumous selection of Burr’s papers, he 
aimed to put his hero in the best light, sometimes destroying or 
altering originals for this greater good.142
Nevertheless, Davis is sometimes careful in his treatment of 
sources. While he excludes Burr’s love letters from his book, he is 
scrupulous enough to announce the omission in his Preface143—a 
Robert K. Ratzlaff, John Rutledge, Jr., South Carolina Federalist, 1766–1819 (1982) 
(summarizing Rutledge’s political life); Patrick J. Furlong, John Rutledge, Jr., and the 
Election of a Speaker of the House in 1799, 24 Wm. & Mary Q., 3d ser., 432 (1967) (re-
producing a letter written by Rutledge). Jefferson’s papers are scattered, but most are 
now online, and all are indexed at the Library of Congress. Davis’s papers are located at 
the New York Historical Society. 
 We also searched archival collections for John Adams, Aaron Burr, Alexander 
Hamilton, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Nicho-
las, Wilson Cary Nicholas, Charles Pinckney, Thomas Pinckney, John Rutledge, Jr., 
and Samuel Smith.
140 Davis was sharply critical of Jefferson’s victory in 1800. See Letter from Matthew 
L. Davis to Albert Gallatin (Jan. 2, 1801), in Matthew Livingston Davis Papers (New 
York Historical Society); Letter from Matthew L. Davis to Edward P. Livingston 
(Feb. 4, 1804), in Matthew Livingston Davis Papers (New York Historical Society). 
He frequently criticized Jefferson for his “lack of good character” and “unethical im-
pulses.” See id. His strong partisanship was undoubtedly sharpened when Jefferson 
rejected Burr’s nomination of Davis to the lucrative position of naval officer for the 
New York City Custom House. See Howard Lee McBain, De Witt Clinton and the 
Origin of the Spoils System in New York 140–44, reprinted in 28 Studies in History, 
Economics and Public Law 1 (1907). 
141 Mushkat, supra note 52, at 107 (“Davis, as most historians view him, was a man 
who could never resist a shady deal or a dishonest dollar, a man whose political acu-
men was constantly available for sale to the highest bidder.”).
142 Professor Mushkat notes that Davis “destroyed many letters that he considered 
damaging, altered others, and generally operated on the premise that future genera-
tions had no right to know the real Aaron Burr.” Id.; see also Worthington C. Ford, 
Some Papers of Aaron Burr, 29 Proc. Am. Antiquarian Soc’y 43, 44–45 (1919) (“[T]he 
righteous indignation of every student of the Burr period is fittingly directed against 
[Davis]. To dip casually into a collection and select almost accidentally a few papers 
would be a procedure to shame a modern investigator . . . . He took unpardonable 
liberties with the text of some which he did print.”). 
143 Here is his statement: 
It is a matter of perfect notoriety, that among the papers left in my possession 
by the late Colonel Burr, there was a mass of letters and copies of letters writ-
ten or received by him, from time to time, during a long life, indicating no very 
strict morality in some of his female correspondents. These letters contained 
matter that would have wounded the feelings of families more extensively than 
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punctilio that other editors of the era would have considered un-
necessary. A similar candor marks his report of the vote-counting 
episode of 1801. He does not puff up the truth value of his account, 
but clearly states that it is double hearsay, leaving it up to the 
reader to assess its ultimate validity.144 What is more, Davis did not 
create the story out of whole cloth. The Aurora does say what he 
says it says145 and, most crucially, our inspection of the original 
documents in the National Archives confirms the key fact that the 
Georgia ballot was legally defective, and blatantly so. 
Davis goes beyond our contemporaneous sources in one impor-
tant particular. While the newspapers focus on the tellers’ public 
announcement of Georgia’s deficiency, Davis highlights Jefferson’s 
aggressive action to preempt further consideration of the matter. 
Should we believe Davis on this point? 
Perhaps the final answer is tucked away in some forgotten ar-
chive. Until some lucky researcher hits pay-dirt, it certainty will 
elude us. Moreover, Davis’s hearsay report does contain errors on 
other matters. While Federalist Senator William Wells was indeed 
the teller designated by the Senate, he did not discover that “the 
envelope was blank; that the return of the votes was not authenti-
cated by the signatures of the electors, or any of them, either on the 
outside or the inside of the envelope, or in any other manner.”146 As 
Figure 2 demonstrates, the electors did sign their names, as re-
quired by statute, on the outside of the envelope.147 Davis is also in-
correct in asserting that the Georgia ballot “merely stated in the in-
side that the votes of Georgia were, for Thomas Jefferson four, and 
could be imagined. Their publication would have had a most injurious ten-
dency, and created heartburnings that nothing but time could have cured. 
 As soon as they came under my control I mentioned the subject to Colonel 
Burr; but he prohibited the destruction of any part of them during his lifetime. I 
separated them, however, from other letters in my possession, and placed them 
in a situation that made their publication next to impossible, whatever might 
have been my own fate. 
1 Davis, supra note 138, at v. 
144 Davis states that he edited Burr’s papers “with the most scrupulous regard to 
[his] own reputation for correctness.” Id. According to Davis, the Burr Memoirs 
“stated facts, and the fair deductions from them, without the slightest intermixture of 
personal feeling.” Id. 
145 Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 16, 1801, at 2. 
146 2 Davis, supra note 138, at 72. 
147 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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for Aaron Burr four, without the signature of any person whatso-
ever.”148 As we have seen, the paper does contain signatures, but 
the signatories do not specify that they are casting an electoral bal-
lot, much less certify their ballot by the standard method. 
It is easy to make too much of such discrepancies, which often 
afflict hearsay reports as they proceed from one speaker to the 
next. As Senator Wells’s report moved to an anonymous Con-
gressman and then to Davis, some noise entered the signal, but not 
to the point of overwhelming the basic story: Georgia’s ballot was 
obviously defective. And if this much of the message came 
through, one should hesitate before dismissing the further report of 
Jefferson’s explicit ruling.
After all, the Constitution delegated to Jefferson, and only Jef-
ferson, an affirmative role in the vote-counting ritual.149 While it is 
debatable whether the text gave him the authority to make a deci-
sive ruling, it is abundantly clear that the tellers had absolutely no 
authority to resolve the matter, and it was perfectly logical for 
them to relieve themselves of the decisional burden by handing the 
ballot to Jefferson. Once they had done so, no responsible presid-
ing officer would have proceeded without examining the suspect 
ballot papers. Davis’s report, while melodramatic, comports with 
the common sense of the situation.150
148 2 Davis, supra note 138, at 72. 
149 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of 
the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall 
then be counted.”) (emphasis added). 
150 A final detail of Davis’s account requires separate consideration. He says that, 
after hurriedly counting the Georgia vote into the Republican column, Jefferson 
“handed to the tellers the package from the next state.” 2 Davis, supra note 138, at 73. 
It is possible (though not likely), however, that Georgia’s envelope was opened last. 
 The electoral votes were not counted in state alphabetical order. Instead, a peculiar 
geographic ordering had become customary. In 1797, for example, John Adams began 
in the South with Tennessee and worked his way northward. Counting Electoral 
Votes, supra note 5, at 12–13; S. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1797); 2 Abridgment 
of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72, at 62–63; Presidential Counts, supra note 
72, at 9. In 1801, Jefferson began with New Hampshire and worked his way south-
ward. Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 30, 33; 10 Annals of Cong. 1023–24 
(1801); H. Jour., 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 796–98 (1801); S. Jour., 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 124–25 
(1801); 2 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72; Presidential Counts, 
supra note 72, at xxii, 11, 16. 
 Georgia might be deemed the southernmost state on some reckonings, thereby sug-
gesting that its envelope would have been opened last. Georgia’s votes were counted 
last, after South Carolina’s, in 1793. Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 10; H. 
ACKERMANPRE1ST 3/18/04 7:34 PM 
2004] Thomas Jefferson 609
What is more, we have uncovered another evidentiary source 
testifying to Jefferson’s involvement. Apparently, his decisive ac-
tion was memorable enough to survive as an oral tradition in Con-
gress as late as 1876, when Senator Hannibal Hamlin recalled the 
event:
[T]here was no certificate accompanying the return that the Elec-
tors met and balloted. It had nothing on its face to show that the 
votes were given for anybody. Clearly it did not conform to the 
Constitution, but it was counted as shown by the record. 
 There was a tradition that the tellers handed it back to Mr. 
Jefferson, who returned it to them, and decided that it must be 
counted.151
In contrast to Davis, Hamlin reports the details surrounding 
Georgia’s ballot with perfect accuracy. Despite the passage of sev-
enty-five years, he says—correctly—that the Georgia envelope 
contained a certificate of ascertainment, but that the ballot “had 
nothing on its face to show that the votes were given for any-
body.”152 His invocation of “tradition” seems to go back to a source 
that is independent of Davis. 
Of course, these two post-1801 sources contribute their confirm-
ing testimony thirty-five and seventy-five years after the fact. Nev-
Jour., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 702 (1793); S. Jour., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 485 (1793); McKnight, 
supra note 5, at 390–91. But in 1797, all reports except one indicate that Georgia was 
counted third (after Tennessee and Kentucky). Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 
5, at 13; 9 S. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1797). But see H. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 
686 (1797) (listing Georgia last). In 1805, Georgia was counted before Tennessee, 
Kentucky, and Ohio (which had not been in the Union for the 1800 election), and oc-
cupied this position for quite a while. Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 36; 14 
Annals of Cong. 1195 (1805); H. Jour., 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1805); S. Jour., 8th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1805); Presidential Counts, supra note 72, at 19, 21. 
 Accounts dealing with February 11, 1801, disagree on the order of voting. Several 
sources list Georgia last in the state-by-state vote graphs. Counting Electoral Votes, 
supra note 5, at 30; 10 Annals of Cong. 1023 (1801); S. Jour., 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 
(1801); 2 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72, at 531; Presidential 
Counts, supra note 72, at 11, 16. Yet others place it third-to-last, followed by Ken-
tucky and Tennessee. H. Jour., 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 799 (1801); Stanwood, supra note 
5, at 63. This placement is more consistent with Georgia’s treatment in the immedi-
ately preceding and succeeding electoral counts. 
151 McKnight, supra note 5, at 293.
152 Id.
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ertheless, modern historians have entirely failed to take it into ac-
count, allowing the entire episode to fall out of sight and mind for 
more than a hundred years.153
Our story is constructed out of three categories of material. Offi-
cial documents demonstrate the illegality of the Georgia ballot, and 
that counting them was necessary in pushing the electoral vote to-
tals for Jefferson and Burr beyond the crucial threshold of seventy 
votes. They also reveal that Jefferson, “in pursuance of the duty 
enjoined upon him” as President of the Senate,154 expressly found 
that he and Burr had gained “a majority of the votes of all the 
Electors appointed.”155 Only on this basis did he send the matter to 
“the House of Representatives to determine the choice”156 for 
President in a runoff limited to two, rather than five, candidates. 
Contemporaneous newspaper reports establish that Jefferson did 
not make his decision inadvertently, but that the tellers clearly and 
publicly announced the defect in the Georgia vote. Subsequent 
hearsay accounts confirm that Jefferson made a focused and self-
conscious decision about the Georgia ballot, and resolved the ques-
tion in a manner that dramatized the intrinsic weakness of the 
Founding design. 
But enough detective work. The next Part considers the larger 
constitutional significance of the Georgia episode. We examine this 
question on two fronts: first putting Jefferson’s decision in its con-
crete historical context, and then considering its enduring implica-
tions as a precedent for future Electoral College disputes. 
IV. JEFFERSON IN CONTEXT
So the Founders made some serious mistakes, as did Thomas 
Jefferson. Constitutional muckraking isn’t much the fashion in 
these hagiographic times, but it is tough to ignore some embarrass-
ing questions: Surely the Framers should have been clever enough 
to note the danger of appointing the fox to superintend the chicken 
coop? Surely Jefferson should have been more up-front about ex-
153 See supra notes 5, 136. 
154 10 Annals of Cong. 1024 (1801). 
155 Id.
156 Id. 
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cluding his Federalist rivals from the House runoff on the basis of a 
transparently defective ballot? 
And yet, there is another side to our story. Placed in a greater 
historical context, Jefferson’s decision may come to seem some-
thing more than a sorry tale of shabby self-dealing. Difficult though 
it may be to believe, Jefferson may have chosen the most states-
manlike way out of an impossible situation. 
 There are even extenuating circumstances surrounding the initial 
blunder by the Founders: It was stupid to place the President of the 
Senate in the chair, but the outcome in 1801 might well have been 
worse had the Founders made a different institutional choice in 
1787. Or so we shall argue. 
A. Substance Over Form 
Begin by recalling Jefferson’s response to the controversy swirl-
ing around the Vermont ballot in 1796. Adams was a mere three 
votes ahead, and Vermont’s total of four represented his margin of 
victory. Nevertheless, Jefferson refused to quibble his way into the 
presidency. Remember his words to Madison: “Surely in so great a 
case, substance & not form should prevail. . . . I pray you to declare 
it on every occasion foreseen or not foreseen by me, in favor of the 
choice of the people substantially expressed, and to prevent the 
phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president at so early a day.”157
Jefferson’s self-restraint in 1797 casts new light on his apparent 
self-dealing in 1801. Perhaps he was acting, in both cases, on the 
same principle: do not allow legal quibbling to produce “the 
phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president” not rooted in the “choice of 
the people.” In 1797, this principle meant supporting Adams; in 
1801, himself. 
But, of course, this recharacterization begs a substantial ques-
tion: How could Jefferson be so sure that the defect in Georgia’s 
ballot was merely formal, and not the result of fraudulent misrep-
resentation?
The question turns primarily on the weight properly accorded a 
single fact: During the final run-up to the vote count, Georgia’s 
votes for Jefferson and Burr seemed a foregone conclusion. News-
157 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 16, 1797), in 16 Madison 
Papers, supra note 5, at 461, 461. 
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papers around the country were regularly placing them in the Re-
publican column without controversy.158 Nobody in Washington 
had made any contrary suggestions. Given the ferocity of partisan 
combat at the time and the closeness of the election, the deafening 
silence had a plain meaning: No smoke equals no fire. For a man of 
the world—and Jefferson was nothing if not a man of the world—
there was an obvious inference. If the Federalists weren’t com-
plaining, then there was nothing to complain about. Despite the 
formal deficiencies, Georgia’s votes should count in the Republi-
can column, with form giving way to substance. 
Of course, Jefferson’s judgment call may have been wrong, and 
one of us has traveled to Georgia on a factfinding mission to ex-
plore the matter further.159 Our conclusion: The state’s four electors 
indisputably voted for Jefferson and Burr, “to the great satisfaction 
of a large concourse of people assembled on the occasion.”160 This 
report by Governor Jackson is abundantly confirmed in local 
158 See supra note 123. 
159 Our review included an examination of the following materials: (1) the papers of 
eight of the most prominent Georgia political figures of the period (Georgia Histori-
cal Society, Savannah) (additionally, each of the other collections was searched for 
papers concerning these eight personalities); (2) every edition of every Georgia news-
paper from January 1800 to February 1801 (University of Georgia Hargrett Library 
for Rare Books and Manuscripts, Athens); (3) records of the Georgia Senate and the 
Georgia House of Representatives for 1799 and 1800; and (4) a book containing the 
Governor’s outgoing official correspondence covering the period between January 
1799 and March 1801 (Georgia Department of Archives and History, Atlanta). A 
broad range of secondary literature was also examined. See supra note 120 and 
sources cited therein; see also E. Merton Coulter, Abraham Baldwin: Patriot, Educa-
tor, and Founding Father (1987); William Omer Foster, Sr., James Jackson: Duelist 
and Militant Statesman (1960); Harvey H. Jackson, Lachlan McIntosh and the Politics 
of Revolutionary Georgia (1979); George R. Lamplugh, Politics on the Periphery: 
Factions and Parties in Georgia, 1783–1806 (1986); Walter McElreath, A Treatise on 
the Constitution of Georgia (1912); Albert Berry Saye, A Constitutional History of 
Georgia: 1732–1968 (1970); E. Merton Coulter, Edward Telfair, 20 Ga. Hist. Q. 99 
(1936); Patrick J. Furlong, Abraham Baldwin: A Georgia Yankee as Old Congress-
man, 56 Ga. Hist. Q. 51 (1972); George R. Lamplugh, George Walton, Chief Justice 
of Georgia, 1783–1785, 65 Ga. Hist. Q. 82 (1981); George R. Lamplugh, “Oh the Co-
lossus! The Colossus!”: James Jackson and the Jeffersonian Republican Party in 
Georgia, 1796–1806, 9 J. Early Republic 315 (1989); Edwin Bridges, George Walton: 
A Political Biography (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) 
(on file with the University of Chicago Library).
160 Letter from Governor James Jackson to Abraham Baldwin (Dec. 5, 1800), in
Abraham Baldwin Papers (University of Georgia at Athens).
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newspapers.161 There is no question about it: If Georgia’s votes had 
not been counted in Washington, form would have indeed tri-
umphed over substance. 
We have been less successful in finding out why the Georgians 
failed, on this one occasion, to comply with constitutional rules 
consistently followed elsewhere. It is clear, however, that the 
Georgians had been particularly inattentive to federal require-
ments during the 1800 campaign. At an earlier stage, the legislature 
had passed a statute providing for the selection of electors as part 
of the general election scheduled in early October.162 In taking this 
step, it violated a federal law requiring all states to pick their elec-
tors “within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in De-
cember.”163 When the bill reached Governor Jackson’s desk, he 
identified the legal problem and vetoed the plan.164 The legislature 
then refused to hold an additional election within the thirty-four-
day window, and chose to select the four electors itself.165
161 On November 19, the Louisville Gazette & Republican Trumpet reported that 
“[i]t is now reduced to a certainty that Mr. Jefferson will get the four votes in this 
state for president.” Louisville Gazette & Republican Trumpet, Nov. 19, 1800, at 3. 
Reports that Georgia voted for Jefferson and Burr appear in various editions of the 
Augusta Herald and the Georgia Gazette. Augusta Herald, Dec. 13, 1800, at 3; Au-
gusta Herald, Dec. 27, 1800, at 2; Augusta Herald, Jan. 3, 1801, at 3; Augusta Herald, 
Jan. 17, 1801, at 2; Augusta Herald, Jan. 28, 1801, at 2; Georgia Gazette, Jan. 8, 1801, 
at 3. 
162 Journal of the Ga. S. 29 (Nov. 30, 1799).
163 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 239, 239. 
164 Journal of the Ga. S. 39 (Dec. 5, 1799); see also Augusta Herald, Nov. 5, 1800, at 
3 (referencing this problem with the proposed law). We have been unable to identify 
any Georgia law enacted before 1800 that regulated the selection of presidential elec-
tors. 
165  Journal of the Ga. H.R. 62–63 (Nov. 5, 1800); Journal of the Georgia Senate 7–8 
(Nov. 5, 1800). On November 18, both houses of the Georgia state legislature met and 
picked John Morrison, Dennis Smelt, Henry Greybill, and John Lumpkin as presiden-
tial electors. Journal of the Ga. H. R. 81 (Nov. 18, 1800); Journal of the Ga. S. 25 
(Nov. 18, 1800). 
 There is another ambiguity. David Blackshear cast one of the electoral votes from 
Georgia, but he was not chosen as one of the original electors. On November 18—the 
day the state legislature picked Smelt, Morrison, Greybill and Lumpkin—Governor 
Jackson may have discovered that Lumpkin could not serve due to family illness, and 
he may have appointed Blackshear in Lumpkin’s place. In the Abraham Baldwin Pa-
pers, there is an official gubernatorial document (complete with seal) that mentions 
the “executive appointment of David Blackshear as an Elector for President and Vice 
President in the room of John Lumpkin.” James Jackson, Gubernatorial Statement 
(Nov. 18, 1800), in Abraham Baldwin Papers (University of Georgia at Athens). The 
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Unfortunately, the Governor was not equally vigilant when the 
electors assembled before a “large concourse” to cast their ballots. 
Nobody intervened to correct Georgia’s legal error, but there was 
no doubt about the underlying intent of the electors.166 Jefferson 
was on solid ground in refusing to make a federal case out of fron-
tier ineptitude. 
B. Prudence and Publicity 
But Jefferson did not merely place Georgia’s votes into the Re-
publican column; he did not publicly acknowledge the existence of 
any sort of problem. In contrast to John Adams four years earlier, 
he did not give his opponents a clear opportunity to raise the issue. 
Instead, he immediately proceeded to cut his Federalist opponents 
out of the runoff.167 Although Jefferson’s decision turned out to be 
substantively sound, surely it was procedurally defective? 
Perhaps not. Though Jefferson did not speak, the tellers an-
nounced the existence of the problem before handing him the 
Georgia document, and loud enough for the newspapers to carry 
the story throughout the land.168 Two of the three tellers were Fed-
eralists, and one of them—if Davis is to be believed—was shocked 
by Jefferson’s rapid disposition of the affair.169 He certainly was in a 
position to stop the vote count and raise a formal objection if he 
chose, but he did not do so. 
There is every reason to suppose that the Georgia delegation 
was among the members of the House and Senate whose “pres-
ence” is constitutionally required at the vote-counting ceremony. 
Two of these Georgians—Benjamin Taliaferro of the House and 
University of Georgia archival staff seems to have dated this document November 18, 
but the document itself states that the Governor “caused the great seal of the said 
State to be put and affixed at the State House in Louisville this tenth day of Decem-
ber in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred.” Id. We think the later date 
is more plausible, especially since the Governor’s outgoing correspondence book con-
tains a letter addressed to Lumpkin and the other three electors dated November 19, 
1800. Letter to Dennis Smelt, John Morrison, Henry Gr[e]ybill, and John Lumpkin 
(Nov. 19, 1800), in Governor’s Letter Book of Gov. James Jackson: March 25, 1800–
March 2, 1801, at 141 (Ga. Dep’t of Archives and History) (1940).
166 See supra note 123.
167 10 Annals of Cong. 1023–24 (1801). 
168 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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James Gunn of the Senate—had been elected as Federalists.170
Surely one or another would have protested if he believed that the 
electors had actually voted a Federalist ticket. No intense partisan-
ship was required to raise this point had it been well founded. 
It is wrong, then, to accuse Jefferson of exploiting his position to 
keep his opponents in the dark. His official silence helped conceal 
his ruling from posterity, but the Georgia problem was not a secret 
to the assembled congressmen. Jefferson had simply shifted the 
burden of going forward to the Federalists in the audience. If they 
wished to create a “Pseudo-president” by raising some legal quib-
bles, it was up to them to make a clear and focused objection. Jef-
ferson certainly was not going to do anything to make their task 
any easier.171
Jefferson’s silence seems particularly sensible in the context of 
the confused legal situation prevailing in 1801. Just the year before, 
Congress tried to pass a statute creating an explicit procedure for 
dealing with electoral vote challenges,172 but it failed to achieve 
consensus,173 leaving everybody with the painfully ambiguous words 
of the Constitution as a guide. The text simply does not specify 
who is to have the last word. Though the President of the Senate 
170 Professor Dauer has Taliaferro listed as a Federalist.  Dauer, supra note 5, at 323. 
The other member of the House of Representatives besides the Federalist Taliaferro, 
James Jones, had died before vote-counting day, but he was also a Federalist. Id. 
Senator Gunn, present on vote-counting day, was a Federalist. See Gunn, James, 
1753-1801, at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000526 (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2004) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). A book that 
provides information on all senators from Georgia does not list Gunn’s partisan af-
filiation, but does say that he engaged in a duel with arch-Republican Georgia Gov-
ernor and Senator James Jackson. Josephine Mellichamp, Senators from Georgia 23 
(1976). 
171 The principle of passivity established by Jefferson remains in force today. Under 
rules established by the Electoral Vote Count Act of 1887, the chair does not raise 
any questions regarding the legitimacy of electoral votes. Rather, a protest must be 
signed by at least one representative and one senator before its consideration will be 
in order. It should also be noted, however, that the Act requires the Senate President 
to apprise the assembled individuals of their opportunity to raise challenges. 3 U.S.C. 
§ 15 (2000) (“Upon such reading of any such certificate or paper, the President of the 
Senate shall call for objections, if any. Every objection shall be made in writing, and 
shall state clearly and concisely, and without argument, the ground thereof, and shall 
be signed by at least one senator and one member of the House of Representatives 
before the same shall be received.”).
172 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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“opens” the votes, he is not expressly authorized to do more; 
though vote counting occurs in the “presence” of the two houses, 
they are not expressly granted any sort of decisionmaking author-
ity, let alone decisive power.174
Jefferson’s silence allowed everybody to resolve the matter 
without a heated legalistic battle. And there can be no question 
that the battle would have been heated. The Federalists had a clear 
majority in Congress.175 This gave them an overwhelming interest in 
stretching the constitutional language to give the final word to the 
House and Senate; while Jefferson, outraged by the partisan theft 
of four crucial votes, would have had every incentive to insist upon 
an expansive reading of his own power to “open” the votes. 
As the parties struggled in legal limbo, they would soon confront 
another danger. There was no obvious method by which to resolve 
their argument. They would be facing an infinite regress: On the 
one hand, the President of the Senate could claim the right to de-
cide whether the President of the Senate possessed the contested 
power; and on the other, senators and representatives might insist 
that their “presence” at the vote count authorized them to override 
the President’s ruling. 
Worse yet, dispatching a factfinding mission to Georgia was not 
feasible. It was the dead of winter, and a snowstorm was swirling 
around the half-built Capitol.176 Even during calmer weather, it 
would take a week or two to travel on terrible roads all the way to 
Augusta, the state capitol.177 Only three weeks remained, however, 
before the inauguration of a new President. Time would run out 
174 See supra notes 114 and 149 and accompanying text.
175 The presence of a Federalist majority in the House of Representatives was dem-
onstrated on February 9, two days prior to the vote count, when the chamber met to 
set the rules for the anticipated House runoff. By a vote of fifty-four to forty-five, the 
Federalists set a rule that the “doors of the House shall be closed during the ballot-
ing” (Rule 5th), and insisted by a vote of fifty-three to forty-seven that the House 
“shall not adjourn until a choice is made” (Rule 4th). See Historic Documents on 
Presidential Elections: 1787–1988, at 76–78 (Michael Nelson ed., 1991); see also Letter 
from Samuel Tyler to Gov. James Monroe (Feb. 9, 1801), in Original Letters, 1 Wm. 
& Mary Q., 1st ser., 99, 102 (1892) (noting that “the Feds had a majority of six votes” 
and had little difficulty getting their version of the rules adopted).
176 See James Rogers Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic 267 (1994). 
177 Lord & Lord, supra note 62, at 79. 
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before a delegation could complete its factfinding mission and re-
turn with a report to the nation’s capitol.178
With factfinding unfeasible, and the constitutional text obscure, 
the proceedings might have simply disintegrated amidst a cloud of 
bitter legalisms—the worst possible result. The nation was already 
in an uproar over the Electoral College tie that had thrown the 
presidency into the House. Confusion would have been com-
pounded if the House runoff had been postponed indefinitely while 
partisans quarreled without any obvious means of closing the de-
bate. The year 1801 marked the first time in American history that 
a political party was called upon to yield power to its rival. Even 
without a prolonged debate over Georgia, it took almost a week 
for the House to choose Jefferson over Burr on its thirty-sixth bal-
lot.179 During this short period, the country was teetering on the 
brink of violence. It is not at all clear whether the forces for violent 
resolution could have been kept in check much longer.180
There was a good deal of constitutional prudence in Jefferson’s 
decision to keep silent. Any express ruling from the chair invited 
his opponents to initiate a counterproductive struggle between the 
President of the Senate and the two houses of Congress over their 
relative competence in the affair. In contrast, the notice from the 
tellers hit just the right note—placing the burden on the Federalists 
to raise an objection if there was any factual basis for supposing 
that Georgia’s electors had cast their ballots for the Federalist can-
didates. 
The wisdom of Jefferson’s decision is confirmed by another 
pregnant silence over the next few weeks. As we have seen, leading 
newspapers all around the country reported the problem with 
178 The 1792 Act required the electors to send another envelope, containing a copy 
of their ballot and the certificate of ascertainment, to a local federal district judge. Act 
of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Stat. 239, 239–40. It seems likely that these documents 
contained the same defects as those delivered to Washington, but we have not been 
able to locate them. If our suspicions are correct, a hypothetical factfinding mission 
would have required a good deal of time before getting to the bottom of the matter. 
Even had the district judge opened his envelope to find a formally perfect electoral 
ballot, it still would have taken too long for the mission to conclude its investigation 
and return to Washington before Inauguration Day. 
179 10 Annals of Cong. 1028 (1801).
180 The reality of mob violence and the risk of civil war is discussed at length in 
Ackerman, supra note 41; see also Sisson, supra note 21, at 423–37 (providing a broad 
range of evidence). 
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Georgia’s ballot.181 Yet we have found no newspaper that contained 
even a hint of an objection to Jefferson’s resolution of the issue—
and this at a time when so many other aspects of the Electoral Col-
lege crisis generated ceaseless controversy. The ready acceptance 
of this decision testifies to Jefferson’s wisdom in avoiding a grand 
institutional confrontation that had no easy constitutional answer. 
C. Pinckney for President? 
To make a final point, suppose that Jefferson had single-
mindedly pursued a formalist course. Once alerted to the problem 
by the tellers, he publicly inspects the documents and proclaims 
that the plain meaning of the Constitution requires him to disqual-
ify the Georgia votes.182 This would have left Jefferson and Burr 
with only sixty-nine votes remaining in their respective columns—
one shy of the seventy needed to exclude Adams, Pinckney, and 
Jay from the House runoff.183 A shift to a five-man runoff would 
have been legally significant, but would it have changed the final 
outcome? 
Winning the runoff proved difficult for Jefferson even when 
Burr was his only opponent. Thanks to another Founding blunder, 
the House making the choice was the lame-duck body elected in 
1798—a year when the Federalists scored significant election victo-
ries.184 Although the party had suffered a number of defections, it 
still controlled the House when its members voted in ordinary fash-
ion. 
But the runoff was decided under special constitutional rules giv-
ing each state delegation a single vote.185 This placed the Federalists 
at a strategic disadvantage—too many of their congressmen were 
bunched in too few states. When some Federalists defected to Jef-
181 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
182 Note that the law required all electors to vote on the first Wednesday in Decem-
ber and did not provide for any sort of re-vote. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Stat. 
239, 239–40.
183 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing conditions for two-
candidate and five-candidate runoffs).
184 1798 was the year of an emerging conflict with France, and the Federalists utilized 
nationalist sentiment as a potent political weapon against the Republicans, who had 
been consistently pro-French in their foreign policy. See Ackerman, supra note 41, at 
61–62.
185 See supra Section I.B. 
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ferson, the party could deliver only six states to Burr, while their 
great antagonist won the vote of eight states. This would have gen-
erated an easy victory for Jefferson but for another technical glitch 
by the Founders. The Constitution required the winning candidate 
to gain an absolute majority of all state delegations without consid-
ering the possibility that some delegations might divide equally. 
Had the Framers focused on this issue, perhaps they would have 
awarded a half-vote to each of the contending candidates. The ab-
sence of specific instructions had a devastating impact in 1801, 
however, when two of the states—Vermont and Maryland—split 
evenly and failed to cast a ballot.186 As a consequence, Jefferson fell 
one vote short of the nine required, and the initial ballot resulted in 
a deadlock: eight for Jefferson, six for Burr, and two not voting.187
The second ballot revealed a drop in Jefferson’s support. Eleven 
Federalists initially voted for Jefferson in recognition of the obvi-
ous fact that he, rather than Burr, was the Republican candidate 
for President. When Jefferson fell short, five of these congressmen 
returned to their party, giving Burr a two or three vote majority.188
Luckily for the Republicans, this shift in individual votes did not 
change the balance of power in any state delegation, and the im-
passe continued until the thirty-sixth ballot, with the Federalists 
desperately searching for a few additional votes. In the words of 
Congressman James Bayard, a key Federalist leader, “By deceiving 
one Man (a great blockhead) and tempting two (not incorruptible) 
[Burr] might have secured a majority of the States.”189
186 10 Annals of Cong. 1028 (1801). 
187 Id. 
188 Under House rules, each member of a state delegation cast a secret ballot, and so 
there is no formal record of the votes of individual representatives. A Republican 
newspaper, however, the National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, published 
lists of the three ballots attributing votes to individual members. National Intelligen-
cer and Washington Advertiser, Feb. 13, 1801, at 3; National Intelligencer and Wash-
ington Advertiser, Feb. 16, 1801, at 2; National Intelligencer and Washington Adver-
tiser, Feb. 18, 1801, at 3. It reported that Jefferson won the individual vote by a 
margin of fifty-five to forty-nine on the first ballot, but that five defections occurred 
on the second and subsequent ballots. Historic Documents on Presidential Elections: 
1787–1988, supra note 175, at 85–88. Given the extreme partisanship prevailing at the 
time, it would be a mistake to accept the Intelligencer’s count as authoritative. If there 
is any sort of bias in this report, however, it seems likely that a Republican newspaper 
would understate the extent of Federalist defection on the second ballot. 
189 Letter from James A. Bayard to Alexander Hamilton (Mar. 8, 1801), in 25 The 
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 344, 345 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977). 
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Jefferson did prevail in the end,190 but the transformation of the 
runoff into a five-candidate affair would have made this final vic-
tory more difficult. Burr was not the Federalists’ candidate of 
choice—they backed him only as a last-ditch effort to stop their 
archenemy Jefferson. With a five-man runoff, they could back real 
Federalists, and this might have made a difference. As we have 
seen, six Federalist congressmen were unwilling to vote for Burr, 
but they might have been happy to vote for Adams. At the very 
least, their blocking coalition would have had even more staying 
power.191 In addition, after fifty or sixty ballots, the exhausted 
House might have broken the impasse by selecting a compromise 
candidate from among the three remaining contenders. 
At this point, the Federalists’ vice-presidential candidate—
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney—would have likely emerged as an 
exceptionally attractive dark horse. Pinckney was the sort of “con-
tinental character” the Founders envisioned as President, with a 
long and distinguished record of public service. He had had a fine 
career as a military officer during the Revolution192 and he served 
as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention.193 He also had es-
190 Professor Ackerman provides a blow-by-blow account of Jefferson’s victory in his 
forthcoming book. See Ackerman, supra note 41. 
191 Professor Manning Dauer’s research indicates one way to assess this point, as he 
provides a table indicating the party affiliation of each member of the House of Rep-
resentatives. Dauer, supra note 5, at 288–331. If one were to assume that all Federal-
ists voted for the leading Federalist candidate in the five-man runoff, it is an easy mat-
ter to use Professor Dauer’s data to determine how the sixteen states would have 
voted. The result: eight states vote Federalist (Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Carolina); six states 
vote Republican (Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and 
Virginia), and two states are evenly split (North Carolina and Vermont). This con-
trasts with the real-world results in the two-man runoff—where eight states voted for 
Jefferson, six voted for Burr, and two split. 10 Annals of Cong. 1028 (1801).
 Strict party-line voting, however, might not have prevailed if the Federalists had 
been afforded an opportunity to vote for a Federalist candidate, and we provide a 
more individualized analysis below. See infra note 199. Nevertheless, the hypothetical 
party-line vote provides a rough sense of the order of magnitude of the shift that 
would have been involved. Note, however, that the Dauer data does not yield a clear 
victory to the Federalist candidate: The Constitution requires a total of nine votes, 
and the hypothetical Federalist wins only eight. It is this conclusion that leads us to 
speculate about Pinckney’s emergence as a compromise candidate in the text that fol-
lows.
192 Marvin R. Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: Founding Father 47–70 
(1967). 
193 Id. at 87–96. 
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tablished a record of moderation during the 1790s—supporting his 
party when it came to the war with France,194 but opposing it when 
it came to the oppressive Alien and Sedition Acts.195 He would 
have had the wholehearted backing of the formidable Alexander 
Hamilton.196 Indeed, once Adams left the scene, Pinckney became 
the Federalist standard-bearer for the presidential elections of 1804 
and 1808.197 Last but not least, Pinckney was a South Carolinian, 
making him an especially attractive compromise candidate. The 
bulk of Jefferson’s support was in the South.198 Had it become clear 
that Jefferson could never win nine state delegations, his followers 
194 Id. at 136–64. 
195 Letter from William Vans Murray to John Quincy Adams (Mar, 22, 1799), in An-
nual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1912, 529, 529–30 
(1914). 
196 Pinckney admired Hamilton. E.g., Letter from Charles C. Pinckney to James 
McHenry (Oct. 31, 1798), in George Washington Papers (Library of Congress) (“I 
knew that [Hamilton’s] talents in war were great, that he had a genius capable of 
forming an extensive military plan, and a spirit courageous & enterprising, equal to 
the execution of it.”) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Hamilton 
conducted an aggressive campaign to elect Pinckney. He wrote letters to his comrades 
telling them of his decision to support the South Carolinian. See Letter from Alexan-
der Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick (May 10, 1800), in 24 The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton, supra note 189, at 475, 475 (“I will never more be responsible for [Adams] 
by my direct support—even though the consequence should be the election of Jeffer-
son. . . . The only way to prevent a fatal scism in the Federal party is to support 
G[eneral] Pinckney in good earnest.”) (emphasis omitted); Letter from Alexander 
Hamilton to Charles Carroll (Aug. 7, 1800), in 25 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 
supra note 189, at 60, 60 (“As between Pinckney & Adams I give a decided prefer-
ence to the first.”). He traveled to New England and wrote to others of the support in 
the North for Pinckney. Introductory Note to Letter from Alexander Hamilton to 
Benjamin Stoddert (June 6, 1800), in 24 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, supra 
note 189, at 574, 574–85; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Charles Carroll (July 1, 
1800), in 25 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, supra note 189, at 1, 1–2; Letter from 
Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior (July 1, 1800), in 25 The Papers of 
Alexander Hamilton, supra note 189, at 4, 4–5 (“I have been in Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire & Rhode Island. There is little doubt of Federal Electors in all. But there 
is considerable doubt of a perfect Union in favour of Pinckney. The leaders of the 
first class are generally right but those of the second class are too much disposed to be 
wrong. It is essential to inform the most discreet of this description of the facts which 
denote unfitness in Mr. Adams. I have promised confidential friends a correct state-
ment. To be able to give it, I must derive aid from you. Any thing you may write shall 
if you please be returned to you. But you must be exact & much in detail.”). 
197 For a description of Pinckney’s role as the Federalist standard-bearer in the 1804 
and 1808 campaigns, see Zahniser, supra note 192, at 234–60.
198 In the two-candidate runoff, Jefferson won all southern states except for South 
Carolina. See 10 Annals of Cong. 1028 (1801). 
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might have bitterly consented to the selection of another south-
erner of great distinction.199
All of this is sheer speculation, but Pinckney’s dark-horse candi-
dacy gains a measure of reinforcement from one of our sources. 
Writing thirty-five years after the event, Davis concludes his hear-
say account by putting words in the mouth of Senator William 
Wells, one of the three tellers: “Mr. Wells further stated, that if the 
votes of Georgia had not been thus counted, as it would have 
brought all the candidates into the House, Mr. Pinckney among the 
number, Mr. Jefferson could not have been elected President.”200
Although Davis has been proven correct on his basic point about 
Georgia, his story contains too many other minor errors to justify 
199 A hypothetical scenario involving party-line voting in a five-candidate race was 
presented previously. See supra note 191. We shall now analyze the real-world voting 
in the two-candidate race and consider how Pinckney’s compromise candidacy might 
have induced a swing in his direction. South Carolina consistently voted for Burr in 
the two-man runoff, and it seems obvious that the state would have been more than 
happy to shift to Pinckney, a favorite son. Pinckney also had obvious attractions for 
North Carolina, whose delegation was split five to five along party lines. While the 
state in fact cast its vote for Jefferson in the two-man runoff, Pinckney would have 
been a far more attractive candidate than Burr. Indeed, at least one newspaper report 
predicted that the state would split evenly when Burr was the only alternative. 
American & Daily Advertiser (Baltimore), Jan. 15, 1801, at 2. A North Carolina vote 
for Jefferson was hardly foreordained, especially if he had repeatedly demonstrated 
his incapacity to win the nine votes needed to win the presidency. 
 The same is true of Georgia. Benjamin Taliaferro was elected as a Federalist but 
often voted with the Republicans, see Dauer, supra note 5, at 315–25, and voted for 
Jefferson over Burr in the runoff. National Intelligencer (D.C.), Feb. 13, 1801, at 3. 
Nevertheless, he would have been under intense pressure from the Federalist estab-
lishment to vote for Pinckney as a compromise candidate. 
 With North Carolina and Georgia in his column, in addition to the block of six who 
voted for Burr, Pinckney would have required only one more swing vote. Potential 
support seems greatest from two states—Tennessee (voting one to zero for Jefferson) 
or Maryland (splitting four-to-four between Jefferson and Burr). Id. New Jersey was 
also teetering three-to-two during the Jefferson-Burr struggle, see id., and one of its 
Republicans, James Linn, was frequently mentioned as a potential defector to the 
Federalist cause. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 19, 
1800), in 17 Madison Papers, supra note 5, at 444, 444–45 (“It is thought by some 
that . . . Linn of N.J. will come over.”); see also Morton Borden, The Federalism of 
James A. Bayard 88 (1955) (“Mr. Linn of [New] Jersey is . . . at present with us, which 
gives the vote of that State—but might be thrown off.”) (citing Letter from John Dal-
las to Alexander Dallas (Jan. 15, 1801), in Alexander J. Dallas Papers (Historical So-
ciety of Pennsylvania)). 
200 2 Davis, supra note 138, at 73. 
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great confidence in this particular.201 Nevertheless, his decision to 
mention Pinckney should not be discounted entirely. Whatever his 
other failings, Davis was politically astute. He would not have in-
cluded the reference if he thought the dark-horse candidacy was a 
complete nonstarter. 
So there it is: With Jefferson and Adams battling to a hopeless 
impasse in the five-candidate runoff, the third President of the 
United States might well have been Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. 
Consider the resulting uproar when it was discovered, weeks 
later, that Jefferson actually had won all four Georgia votes, and 
that his constitutional punctilios as President of the Senate had led 
to his own defeat by Federalist partisanship in the five-man runoff. 
The resulting crisis would have been far worse than those occurring 
in the aftermath of Hayes-Tilden in 1876 or Bush-Gore in 2000. 
Both of these crises bitterly disappointed the losers, but they could 
never prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they had actually 
won the underlying electoral votes in controversy. In contrast, Jef-
fersonians would have been in a position to establish, to a cer-
tainty, that their candidate had been denied the presidency on a 
mere technicality. 
Perhaps, however, the operation of a final constitutional gim-
mick might have saved the situation. If the House of Representa-
tives had selected Adams or Pinckney, it would have been up to 
the Senate to select the Vice-President under yet another set of 
rules. The Constitution generally gives this office to the defeated 
presidential candidate with the most votes, but the Senate is au-
thorized to choose among candidates “who have equal votes” after 
the President has been selected—Jefferson or Burr in this case.202 If 
the Senate had sought to console Jefferson with the number two 
spot, a national crisis might have been avoided if Pinckney (or Ad-
ams) had responded to the subsequent news from Georgia by vol-
201 See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
202 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the 
Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice Presi-
dent. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall 
chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.”) (amended 1804).
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untarily allowing the Vice-President to become the fourth Presi-
dent of the United States.203
 If Pinckney or Adams refused to resign the country might, how-
ever, have found itself on the brink of civil war. Even during the 
two-man runoff, Republican governors were organizing military 
force in the event the House Federalists managed to reject Jeffer-
son. Jefferson himself was making some very dark threats during 
the impasse.204 But in the end, the Federalists chose to abandon 
Burr rather than push the country over the edge. Would they have 
shown similar restraint had their favorites remained in the run-
ning? This was a crisis the infant republic did well to avoid. 
D. Jefferson and the Rule of Law 
When we first discovered Georgia’s electoral ballot in the Na-
tional Archives, we believed we had a first-rate scandal on our 
hands. The meaning of it all seemed painfully clear: Jefferson egre-
giously violated the express terms of the Constitution in the pursuit 
of overweening ambition. His presidency was born of constitu-
tional original sin. In its own way, this was as bad as Sally Hemings. 
The more we have pondered, however, the less we have been 
scandalized. To be sure, it is always a serious matter to ignore the 
rules laid down by the text, even when they are incompetently 
drafted. But in our constitutional tradition, the rule of rules is only 
one component of a more complex understanding of the rule of 
law.205 Placed in full historical context, Jefferson’s decision provokes 
renewed appreciation for the complexities of constitutional interpre-
tation, with three distinct dimensions salient in the present case. The 
first—principle. As his actions in 1796 demonstrate, Jefferson was 
203 At the time, the Senate was composed of nineteen Federalists and thirteen Re-
publicans. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colo-
nial Times to 1957, at 692 (1960). In contrast to the runoff in the House, each senator 
was to cast an individual vote. It was thus theoretically possible that the Federalists 
would have awarded the vice-presidency to Burr rather than Jefferson, but this seems 
quite unlikely.
204 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Feb. 15, 1801), in Jef-
ferson Papers 998, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjser1.html 
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). For a comprehensive examina-
tion of the explosive situation, see Ackerman, supra note 41, at 93–135. 
205 But see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1175 (1989) (emphasizing the importance of rule-following in our legal tradition).
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serious about avoiding the “the phaenomenon of a Pseudo-
president.”206 Invalidating the Georgia ballot on a legal technicality 
would have been at war with this principle. Jefferson had ample 
reason to believe that Georgia had in fact cast its votes for the Re-
publican ticket. He was correct to use his power as Senate Presi-
dent to assure that the vote-counting ritual in Washington corre-
sponded to the true electoral decisions made in the states. The 
second—prudence. Jefferson was confronting a genuinely difficult 
institutional question. A high-visibility ruling on the Georgia ballot 
would have provoked an intense struggle between the President of 
the Senate and the Houses of Congress over their respective con-
stitutional prerogatives. So long as notice of the Georgia problem 
had been conveyed to the opposition, was it not wise for Jefferson 
to avoid such a counterproductive struggle if at all possible? The 
third—pragmatism. Strict compliance with the formal rules risked 
genuinely catastrophic consequences. Sending all five candidates 
into the House runoff could have pushed the country to the brink 
of civil war. 
All in all, it was not the best moment for a rule of rules unvar-
nished by principle, prudence, or pragmatism to prevail. By recog-
nizing this, Jefferson provides a glimpse into the meaning of consti-
tutional statesmanship well worth bringing to light after all these 
years.
E. Dumb Luck 
A dose of historicism adds nuance to our earlier critique of the 
Founding blunder—or better, blunders—in connection with the 
construction of the Electoral College. Recall that the most signifi-
cant mistake involved the Founders’ failure to anticipate the rise of 
national political parties. Others were more perceptive, most nota-
bly Edmund Burke, who had already begun to reflect on this great 
change in political practice.207 Had the Founders been equally far-
206 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
207 See Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), in
1 Select Works of Edmund Burke 69, 145–56 (Francis Canavan ed., 1999). Professor 
Richard Hofstadter, the most acute historian of this subject, could not find anybody in 
late eighteenth-century America who shared Burke’s views. Hofstadter, supra note 
18, at 29–35.
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sighted, they would never have chosen their “two-vote” scheme for 
the Electoral College. 
Putting this big mistake to one side, it was still silly to give the 
sitting Vice-President a central position in the vote count. Had the 
Convention considered the likelihood that the President of the 
Senate might run for the presidency, they would have changed the 
text in a minute. But they did not, so they did not do so, and this 
failure is nothing to brag about. 
Nevertheless, the Georgia episode adds an ironic gloss to this 
Founding blunder. To see our point, suppose that the Framers had 
adverted to the problem and consider how they most probably 
would have solved it: If the sitting Vice-President was a poor 
choice to supervise the ballot count, who should be his replace-
ment?
The obvious pick was the Chief Justice—the only constitutional 
official possessing the impartiality required of the vote-counting 
job. Indeed, the Founders made this choice when confronting a 
similar problem in designing the impeachment process. The im-
peachment trial took place before the Senate, and the President of 
the Senate would preside unless the Convention made a special ex-
ception for his removal from the chair. The Founders spotted the 
absurdity of allowing the sitting Vice-President to preside over a 
proceeding that could make him President. Article I, Section 3 ex-
plicitly provides that “When the President . . . is tried, the Chief 
Justice shall preside.”208 They undoubtedly would have made an 
identical substitution had they focused on the identical problem 
raised by the vote-counting ritual.  
This is the point at which our paradox emerges: Had the Foun-
ders possessed greater foresight, the result would have turned out 
208 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. For an explanation of this language, see William 
Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 206 (Philadelphia, 
H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825) (“As the vice president succeeds to the functions and 
emoluments of the president of the United States whenever a vacancy happens in the 
latter office, it would be inconsistent with the implied purity of a judge that a person 
under a probable bias of such a nature, should participate in the trial—and it would 
follow that he should wholly retire from the court.”). For an echo of this sentiment, 
albeit in the context of factional politics, see The Federalist No. 10, at 47 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own 
cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, 
corrupt his integrity.”). 
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much worse. Jefferson’s replacement as chair on February 11 
would have been John Marshall, whom the Federalists had placed 
in office only the week before.209 While the Founding blunder 
placed Jefferson in an awkward position, our ultimate conclusion is 
that he made the best of a bad situation—elevating substance over 
form and preventing a legitimation crisis of the first magnitude. In 
contrast, Chief Justice Marshall would almost certainly have acted 
differently. A confirmed Jefferson-hater,210 he would have found 
himself in the delightful position of making a technically correct
ruling against Georgia that favored Federalist interests. Since the 
Constitution explicitly requires that all the electors “sign and cer-
tify” their state’s return, and clearly designate the persons they 
were “vot[ing] for,” the formal case was open and shut: “Sorry 
Georgia, but you don’t count (and, alas, given the execrable postal 
service southwards, your formal deficiency cannot be cured by 
March 4).” So the Chief Justice rules that the vote total stands at 
sixty-nine for Jefferson and Burr, one short of a majority, and the 
Federalists get their men into the runoff. 
To be sure, Marshall was eminently capable of transcending 
formalism when it got in the way of his constitutional vision, but 
this vision certainly did not include Thomas Jefferson as President 
of the United States. Not even the most partisan Jeffersonian could 
reasonably complain if the Chief Justice, following the express 
commands of the Constitution, declared that there were only sixty-
nine valid votes in favor of Jefferson and Burr. After all, had not 
the Founders put the Chief Justice in the chair precisely to assure 
that vote counting would proceed in strict compliance with the 
law?
No less important, the Jeffersonians would have been in no posi-
tion to launch an effective challenge to Chief Justice Marshall’s de-
cision. The Federalists controlled both houses of Congress and 
would have voted down any Republican motion to overrule the 
209 See 2 Beveridge, supra note 86, at 557–58.
210 See generally James F. Simon, What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John 
Marshall, and the Epic Struggle to Create a United States (2002) (discussing the last-
ing political battle between the two); Ackerman, supra note 41 (detailing Marshall’s 
extraordinarily partisan conduct during February 1801). 
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chair.211 If the Framers had done their homework, therefore, the 
vote count would have provided Marshall with a splendid opportu-
nity to enter history, slightly prematurely, as a great defender of 
the written Constitution—but with a very different result. 
Consider a few scenarios. Suppose that, despite Chief Justice 
Marshall’s ruling, Jefferson emerged victorious from the five-man 
runoff. Marshall then would have been clearly marked by Jefferson 
as Public Enemy Number One. With the President threatening re-
prisals, would Marshall have had the courage to write Marbury v. 
Madison?212 Would his fellow Justices have joined him in this pre-
meditated assault on the Jeffersonian presidency? And even if they 
had pushed forward, would the Supreme Court have emerged un-
scathed? After all, Jefferson’s campaign to sweep the Federalist 
Justices from the Court only failed when the Senate refused to im-
peach Justice Samuel Chase in a very close vote.213 Jefferson would 
have prosecuted this campaign even more fiercely had his great ju-
dicial antagonist sought to block his way to the presidency during 
the vote count controversy. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s prospects would have been no less grim 
had his ruling led to the victory of his patron Adams,214 or his friend 
Pinckney.215 At best, the Chief Justice would have tied his judicial 
reputation to a ruling that would have been reviled by a large por-
tion of the population; at worst, his decision of February 11 would 
211 This contrasts with the institutional impasse that would have resulted if the Fed-
eralist Congress had sought to overrule Jefferson’s explicit ruling. See supra Section 
IV.B. 
212 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
213 See Simon, supra note 210, at 216–19. For a recap of this event, see Ackerman, 
supra note 41, at ch. 5.
214 Despite his ascent to the bench, Marshall accepted Adams’s request to continue 
serving as his Secretary of State and was discharging his office in an extraordinarily 
partisan fashion. In early February, the Federalists in Congress and the administration 
had rammed through a Judiciary Act creating a set of lower circuit courts. In his ca-
pacity as Secretary of State, Marshall played a leading role in filling these new posi-
tions with Federalist cronies, including two of his brothers-in-law—James Keith Tay-
lor of Virginia and William McClung of Kentucky. See 2 Beveridge, supra note 86, at 
560 n.2; 6 The Papers of John Marshall, supra note 97, at 78 n.2; Ackerman, supra 
note 41, at ch. 2.
215 Pinckney often corresponded with Chief Justice Marshall, discussing the best 
ways to promote Federalist interests. See, e.g., Letter from John Marshall to Charles 
C. Pinckney (Nov, 20, 1800), in 6 The Papers of John Marshall, supra note 97, at 16, 
16–17.
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have helped precipitate a bloody conflict over presidential succes-
sion.216
As we contemplate these scenarios it is impossible to mistake 
the contribution of dumb luck to the affair—“dumb luck” in the 
technical sense. By “dumb” we mean that the Founders were mis-
taken in putting the Vice-President in a constitutional situation 
marked by an egregious conflict of interest; by “luck” we mean 
that we are all lucky that they were dumb, since if they had been 
smarter, things would have come out worse, possibly much worse. 
V. JEFFERSON’S GHOST
Perhaps our discovery has historical value, but does it have en-
during legal significance? 
At the very least, the story serves as a cautionary tale. The re-
public avoided a serious crisis in 1801, yet there is no reason to rely 
on dumb luck when lightning strikes again. We urgently require a 
constitutional amendment removing the sitting Vice-President 
from the chair. And yet, despite the 2000 fiasco, there has been no 
serious effort to focus on the time bomb that might explode the 
next time around if the existing vote-counting process operates 
without judicial interference. 
This failure has a single cause: the Supreme Court’s unantici-
pated intervention in the electoral contest between George W. 
Bush and Albert Gore. While an Electoral College crisis is never 
exactly fun, 2000 was the perfect year for it to happen. The country 
was enjoying an unparalleled period of peace and prosperity. The 
leading contenders made every effort to blur their underlying dis-
agreements. Nobody supposed that there was much at stake in the 
choice between Bush and Gore. If the Supreme Court had not in-
tervened, Congress would have solved the succession problem in 
one way or another, but in a way that would have emphasized the 
obvious anachronisms and irrationalities of the existing system. As 
the television cameras introduced countless viewers to the arcana 
of the electoral count, everybody would agree on one thing—it was 
a clear mistake to allow Vice-President Al Gore to preside over his 
own contest with Bush, and we should pass a constitutional 
amendment to eliminate such absurdities from future contests. 
216 See Ackerman, supra note 41. 
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Judge Richard Posner is precisely wrong, then, in asserting that 
the looming electoral-count crisis on Capitol Hill serves as the only 
sound justification for the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. 
Gore.217 The next vote-counting disaster probably will strike at a 
much less propitious moment in the history of the republic—a time 
when ideologically polarized political parties may be struggling for 
the White House under conditions of grave economic or interna-
tional distress. At such a moment, Judge Posner’s talk of crisis 
might have real substance. When this time comes—in 2004 or 
2084—the Supreme Court may be unwilling or unable to save the 
day, and Americans will be forced to accept the antique legal ar-
rangements the politicians of 2000 failed to address. Whatever the 
jurisprudential merits of Judge Posner’s vaunted “pragmatism,” his 
particular brand is particularly short-sighted. The election crisis of 
2000 provided the “optimal” opportunity to generate the political 
energy needed to spur constitutional amendment. If Bush v. Gore
has any sound justification, Judge Posner has not found it.218
A. From Cautionary Tale to Legal Precedent 
It appears then, that we are stuck with what the Founders have 
given us,219 at least until the next crisis forces the issue to the fore-
front of public concern. This disheartening conclusion returns us to 
our motivating question: Since the original constitutional structure 
continues to guide us, should Jefferson’s decision serve as an im-
portant legal precedent in interpreting its requirements? 
Begin with the case for an affirmative answer. As we have seen, 
the constitutional text does not clearly allocate decision-making 
power between the President of the Senate and the Congress. 
Worse yet, the text’s opacity merely serves as the tip of the Found-
ing iceberg—the sad truth is that nobody was thinking about the 
217 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See generally Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 
2000 Election, the Constitution, and the Courts (2001) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s decision was justified by pragmatic considerations of political stability). 
218 In this he is not alone. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy 
(Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (presenting perspectives on various justifications for the 
Supreme Court’s decision to end the 2000 presidential election). 
219 Of course, the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments importantly altered the 
original mechanisms for presidential selection, but they do not speak to the particular 
issue in question here: the power of the Senate President to resolve questions arising 
with regard to the vote count. U.S. Const. amend. XII; U.S. Const. amend. XXII. 
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problem in Philadelphia, and that is why the text is so unsatisfac-
tory. Given this failure, even textualists should accord substantial 
weight to subsequent practice in resolving constitutional indeter-
minacies.220 Ought implies can: If you can’t follow the text, you 
should respect the conscientious practice of leading statesmen who 
have attempted to make sense of textual perplexity. 
The fact that Jefferson exercised the (textually arguable) author-
ity, therefore, as Senate President on the Georgia matter seems 
very significant as a legal matter.221 What is more, Jefferson’s ruling 
220 For a case study on the dangers of a misguided textualism, see Kesavan, supra 
note 5, at 1696–1759. Kesavan declares that the text forbids the President of the Sen-
ate from serving as the presiding officer of the vote count, despite the fact that he is 
the only officer explicitly mentioned by the text, and despite two centuries of unbro-
ken practice in which he has performed this role without the slightest challenge. In-
stead, Kesavan disqualifies the Senate President on the basis of emanations from 
other constitutional clauses that do not explicitly speak to the problem. Id. at 1696–
1701. 
 Worse yet, he does not propose a plausible presiding officer substitute, instead stat-
ing that “[t]he answer to this question is simpler than it appears: One of the senators 
and representatives then and there present at the electoral count.” Id. at 1701. In any 
disputed election, however, each political party will want to have one of its own mem-
bers serve as the presiding officer, and Kesavan does not say much about how best to 
choose among the applicants for the job. He states merely that “[e]ach parliamentary 
body has, almost by definition, the right to choose its presiding officer,” id., but fails to 
consider that there are two parliamentary bodies involved and that they will predictably 
disagree about whether a senator or representative should take the chair. 
 Early commentators also discussed the subject. Chancellor Kent stated that “the 
president of the senate counts the votes, and determines the result, and that the two 
houses are present only as spectators, to witness the fairness and accuracy of the 
transaction, and to act only if no choice be made by the electors.” 1 James Kent, 
Commentaries on American Law 258–59 (New York, O. Halsted 1826). He also said 
that the Senate President has this power “in the absence of all legislative provision on 
the subject.” Id. at 258. 
 Much more importantly, subsequent Congresses have clearly understood the Con-
stitution to imply that the Senate President should serve as presiding officer, owing to 
the fact that the Constitution commands him to open the electoral vote packages. De-
spite Kesavan’s repeated claims to have divined the one true meaning of the “text,” 
his interpretations seem far less plausible than those that Congress has consistently 
adopted over the course of two centuries. 
221 The constitutional opinions of early Congresses have often been interpreted as 
matters of great importance. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986) 
(noting that records of the early Congresses provide “‘weighty evidence’ of the Con-
stitution’s meaning” (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983))); Hum-
phrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630–31 (1935) (looking to the laws of early 
Congresses for support of its decision); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174–75 
(1926) (stating that opinions of the First Congress “have always been regarded . . . as 
of the greatest weight” in constitutional interpretation). This is hardly the place to 
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might well have made a difference to the outcome—one of his ri-
vals could have emerged victorious from a five-man runoff. This 
greatly enhances the precedential significance of his ruling. While 
there have been quite a few counting controversies over the centu-
ries, almost all of them did not make the slightest difference to the 
electoral outcome.222 With the stakes nonexistent, there was no 
pressing reason for the participants to take the constitutional issues 
seriously. They were more inclined to resolve the matter quickly, 
so that the vote count could proceed to its predestined announce-
ment of the victorious presidential candidate.223 Not so in 1801, 
when the four Georgia votes were of the greatest strategic impor-
tance.
The fact that it was Jefferson in the chair also matters. Putting 
hagiography to one side, he had devoted his four years as President 
of the Senate to drafting that body’s first set of rules for parliamen-
tary procedure224—rules that continue to influence the practice of 
both the Senate and House of Representatives even today. 
Finally, it would be wrong to dismiss and characterize Jefferson’s 
ruling as merely self-interested. To the contrary, his decision can 
consider, in general, when this reliance is justified as a matter of constitutional theory. 
It suffices to say that it is justified in the present case. 
222 The principal incidents are usefully summarized in Kesavan, supra note 5, at 
1679–94. Although we find Kesavan’s interpretations of the Constitution unpersua-
sive, his piece contains an admirably exhaustive review of the relevant primary and 
secondary literature. 
223 Indeed, on several occasions, the President of the Senate has declared the results 
in a manner that expressly deprived his resolution of any precedential status. The 
practice began in 1821. Missouri had selected its electors before it had been formally 
admitted as a state by Congress. When its electoral vote was opened, the propriety of 
counting it was challenged. In response, the President of the Senate announced that 
Monroe had been elected President regardless of whether Missouri’s vote was 
counted. See Kesavan, supra note 5, at 1681–83. The Senate President finessed the 
matter in an identical fashion during the vote count of 1837, in which the votes of 
Michigan were at issue. Id. at 1685. 
 Vice-President Nixon took a similar approach when a late recount of the Hawaii 
vote revealed that the Kennedy-Johnson ticket had carried the state. As Senate Presi-
dent, he refused to count the earlier electoral vote that had been awarded to the 
Nixon-Lodge ticket on the basis of the pre-recount vote count. In counting the state’s 
electors for his opponents, he declared that “[t]he Chair has knowledge, and is con-
vinced that he is supported by the facts.” See 107 Cong. Rec. 290 (1961). He explicitly 
stated, however, that he was counting these votes merely to avoid further delay, and 
“without the intent of establishing a precedent.” Id. 
224 Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of The Senate 
of the United States (D.C., Samuel Harrison Smith 1801).
ACKERMANPRE1ST 3/18/04 7:34 PM 
2004] Thomas Jefferson 633
be defended from the multiple perspectives of principle, prudence, 
and pragmatism.225
So it would seem that if precedent is important anywhere in con-
stitutional law, it would be important here—where a constitutional 
statesman of the first rank, having spent years reflecting on matters 
of parliamentary procedure, makes a ruling that illuminates a con-
stitutional question that the Framers had so evidently failed to con-
front, let alone resolve, with any clarity. 
So much for the affirmative case for precedential significance. 
Are there any serious counterarguments? The most salient objec-
tion involves Jefferson’s failure to announce his ruling publicly. 
Does not his refusal to take public responsibility for his decision 
undermine its enduring significance? 
This objection would be compelling if the legal deficiencies of 
the Georgia ballot had been kept secret. If the House and Senate 
had been kept in the dark, this would indeed deprive Jefferson’s 
decision of any precedential value. It would indicate that Jefferson 
himself believed that he was engaging in a devious maneuver that 
could not withstand the test of public reason. 
But this is not what happened. The newspaper accounts make it 
perfectly clear that the tellers put the assembled House and Senate 
on notice of the Georgia deficiency.226 Jefferson did not make his 
decision secretly. He simply shifted the burden to the senators and 
representatives to raise objections. While he might have gone fur-
ther, in the manner of John Adams, his failure to do so was pru-
dent under the circumstances.227 The assembled senators and con-
gressman had an opportunity to make an objection, and they did 
not make use of it. 
Moreover, Jefferson publicly took responsibility for the entire 
vote count: “[I]n pursuance of the duty enjoined upon him,” he de-
clared that he and Burr had won “a majority of the votes of all the 
Electors appointed.”228 He could not make this declaration without 
counting the four Georgia votes in the Republican column. So the 
225 See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
226 See supra notes 126–31. 
227 Even today, a challenge to an electoral vote requires at least one senator and one 
representative to come forward and make his objections explicit. Otherwise, the 
President of the Senate counts the vote. See supra note 171.
228 10 Annals of Cong. 1024 (1801). 
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fact that he had made a ruling on the Georgia matter was obvious 
to anybody interested in counting the votes—and surely the sena-
tors and congressman observing Jefferson were, like all politicians, 
good at vote counting. No less important, the newspapers put the 
country on notice of the Georgia deficiencies, and, despite the bit-
ter partisanship of the time, nobody seems to have protested Jef-
ferson’s decision.229
In short, Jefferson’s actions not only illuminate a constitutional 
question left unresolved by the original constitutional text, but they 
also resolved a potentially explosive problem in a manner that gar-
nered public consent. What more can we ask of a legal precedent? 
It is true, of course, that the relevant documents disappeared for 
more than a century before they were rediscovered. This might be 
important if other precedents had accumulated during the interim 
that were inconsistent with Jefferson’s ruling. If this had occurred, 
it might be wiser to ignore the rediscovered early precedent rather 
than disturb well-established arrangements. 
In the real world, however, the law remains unsettled. Apart 
from 1801 and 2001, there is only one other case where the powers 
of the Senate President posed a genuinely consequential issue. This 
involved the Hayes-Tilden crisis of 1877, and as we shall see, the 
resolution reached in 1877 should serve as a very important gloss 
on the meaning of 1801. 
It is one thing to recognize that the decision of 1801 is not the 
only relevant precedent; it is quite another to say that it should not 
count as a precedent when the Founding machinery once again ex-
plodes in our face. 
B. The Gloss of 1877 
The Hayes-Tilden election hit the nation at a bad time. The 
country was in the throes of a vicious economic depression, and the 
election returns threatened to inflame the passions of the recent 
Civil War. For the first time since 1860, the Democratic candidate, 
Samuel Tilden, had won the popular vote by a convincing margin 
of 250,000.230 Yet his victory was jeopardized by a dispute over 
eighteen electoral votes from three southern states still under the 
229 See supra notes 126–31. 
230 See Allan Nevins, Abram S. Hewitt 320 (1935).
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(very shaky) control of Republican Reconstruction governments.231
If all eighteen found their way into the Republican column, Tilden 
would be deprived of his popular victory by a single electoral vote. 
With the Democrats clamoring at the gates of power, millions of 
Republicans saw the impending vote count in apocalyptic terms in-
herited from the Civil War. For these true believers, the Democ-
ratic party was the party of treason, threatening to profane the 
temple of the Union—a prospect to be avoided at all costs. What is 
more, the antiquated electoral machinery afforded them an oppor-
tunity to bar the barbarians from the White House. 
While the Democrats had won landslide victories in the House 
after the Panic of 1873, the Republicans remained in control of the 
Senate.232 This provided them with a tempting constitutional tech-
nique for maintaining control over the presidency. Vice-President 
Henry Wilson had died in 1875, but the Republicans could still ap-
point the President Pro Tem of the Senate, who would then preside 
over the vote-counting ritual.233 Their man in the chair could count 
the challenged Republican electors into the Hayes column while 
senators and representatives cheered and booed, but the Democ-
rats could do little to change the outcome. Although the Democ-
ratic House might vote to overrule the chair, the Republican Sen-
ate would not support such a move—even if it were constitutional. 
To be sure, the precedent set by Thomas Jefferson in 1801 was 
not widely known at the time.234 Nevertheless, there was a good 
deal of respectable constitutional opinion that expansively inter-
preted the Senate President’s power to “open” the electoral certifi-
cates, transforming it into a grander authority to resolve with some 
finality doubtful questions arising in the vote-counting process. In-
deed, some Democrats had explicitly endorsed this view in con-
gressional debates held before the Hayes-Tilden election revealed 
231 Charles Fairman, Five Justices and the Electoral Commission of 1877, at 40–47, 
57–116 (1988). 
232 Democrats did not gain control of the Senate until the election of 1878. See 2 
Congressional Quarterly, Guide to Congress 828 tbl. 30-1 (5th ed. 2000).
233 They selected Senator Thomas Ferry, a Michigan Republican. 1 Stanwood, supra 
note 5, at 388.
234 Some memory traces clearly remained, however. See supra note 151 and accom-
panying text. 
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its short-run partisan implications.235 This put Republicans in the 
delicious position of quoting Democratic politicians while their 
Senate President Pro Tem pushed Hayes into the White House.236
Delicious but dangerous—how would the country react to such 
blatant partisanship? Fortunately, we will never know. In a re-
markable show of political restraint, the Republican leadership re-
fused to abuse the power of the Senate presidency for partisan 
ends. Instead, they reached out to House Democrats to pass the 
first statute in American history to regulate the vote-counting rit-
ual. 237
The constitutional rationale for statutory action was based on 
the structure of the text: “The President of the Senate shall, in the 
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.”238 Since the last 
provision grants the federal government a distinct “counting 
power,” but the preceding clauses do not clearly state how count-
ing should proceed, Congress may enact appropriate legislation 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.239
235 See, e.g., 44 Cong. Rec. 1803 (1876) (statement of Sen. William Pinkney Whyte). 
Not all Democrats were in agreement, however. See, e.g., 43 Cong. Rec. 970 (1875) 
(statement of Sen. Bayard). 
236 Republicans surely enjoyed reading of the views of Democratic Party Chairman 
Abram Hewitt, who, after the Hayes-Tilden deadlock, had been vocal in asserting that 
the Senate President could not decide matters himself, but rather should work with 
“Congress to go behind the certificate and open the same to go into the merits of all 
cases.” Allan Nevins, Abram S. Hewitt 327 (1935). 
237 The Democratic-controlled House, in response to a resolution proposed by Re-
publican Representative George McCrary of Iowa, adopted legislation establishing a 
committee to consider how to resolve the situation. 44 Cong. Rec. 91–92 (1876). The 
Republican-controlled Senate then voted to establish its own committee. 44 Cong. 
Rec. 258 (1876). Starting on January 12, the two committees met together, and their 
collaborative efforts eventually generated the statute. 44 Cong. Rec. 613 (1877); 44 
Cong. Rec. 1050 (1877). 
238 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
239 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. One does not need to look hard to find references to 
this clause as the basis for action to regulate the electoral count. 43 Cong. Rec. 974–75 
(1875) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); 43 Cong. Rec. 971–73 (1875) (statement of Sen. 
Thurman); 10 Annals of Cong. 29–32 (1800). A decade later, the drafters of the Elec-
toral Count Act assumed that the Necessary and Proper Clause was the part of the 
Constitution that gave them the authority to act. 48 Cong. Rec. 5461 (1884); Counting 
Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 455 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). Consistent con-
gressional practice of the past 125 years presupposes the Act’s constitutionality, as 
does the recent Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000), 
whose reasoning depends critically on Florida’s presumed unwillingness to sacrifice 
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This straightforward rationale provided the Republican leader-
ship with a solid platform for constructing a far more impartial 
procedure, calculated to assure the country of the integrity of the 
selection process. The proposed statute established a fifteen-man 
Electoral Commission comprised of five members of the House of 
Representatives, five senators, and five Justices of the Supreme 
Court. Each house was to appoint three members from the major-
ity party and two from the minority—leading to a five-five split in 
the congressional delegation. The proposed statute also named 
four of the five Justices—two Democrats and two Republicans—
and charged them with the task of naming a fifth as potential tie-
breaker.240 Although their choice was formally open, it was per-
fectly obvious who they were supposed to choose: Justice David 
Davis of Illinois. While he had begun his career in national politics 
as Abraham Lincoln’s campaign manager in 1860, Davis had 
drifted away from the party’s mainstream. By 1876, he was broadly 
the benefits provided to its electoral vote by the statute’s “safe harbor” provision. 
 Nevertheless, Vasan Kesavan urges us to reject this consistent practice in favor of 
an implausible interpretation of the constitutional text. Recall that the Constitution 
grants Congress power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution . . . all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. According to Article II, 
officers of the government are plainly vested with the power to “open” and to 
“count” the electoral ballots. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. Nevertheless, Kesavan as-
serts that it “is more than doubtful” that this grant counts as a “power” within the 
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Kesavan, supra note 5, at 1737. 
 Kesavan’s comments fail to convince. He points to the fact that Article II does not 
explicitly use the word “power,” or some verbal analogue, in granting vote-counting 
authority. Id. at 1735–38. But why should this verbal technicality matter? Authority to 
count the votes is a “power” within the ordinary meaning of the term, and Kesavan 
gives no special reason for a narrowing construction, especially provided the generous 
interpretation traditionally given to the scope of the clause. See McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 Kesavan adds that the constitutional concept of “power” requires that its holder 
have discretion in its exercise and that, in his view, the vote counters have no such 
discretion—they are simply to determine which votes are valid, and count only those. 
Kesavan, supra note 5, at 1737 n.351. Even if Kesavan were correct in viewing the 
power as nondiscretionary, it still remains a power, and a statute is still “necessary 
and proper” given the text’s failure to make clear who should exercise the power in 
doubtful cases. In our view, it would require a far more compelling argument to over-
ride the deference that is due to the consistent practices of the Congress and the Su-
preme Court. 
240 Act of January 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227, 228. 
ACKERMANPRE1ST 3/18/04 7:34 PM 
638 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:551
considered to be an independent with Democratic leanings, some-
one who would be fair to Tilden’s claim.241
All things considered, the Republicans’ proposed statute made 
the most of the constitutional materials available. By placing the 
final decision in Davis’s hands, the leadership had effectively 
eliminated the prospect of partisan self-dealing by the President of 
the Senate. To be sure, the statute was cleverly designed to pre-
serve the Senate President’s symbolic centrality. He was assigned 
the task of “open[ing]” the ballots, but should a protest be voiced 
from the floor, he was instructed to pass the contested ballot to the 
Commission and await its decision before completing the vote 
count.242 The Commission’s decisions, in turn, could be overruled 
by a majority vote of each house of Congress acting separately,243
but this was unlikely given the split in party control. The danger of 
self-dealing posed by the Senate President had been subordinated 
to a Commission carefully designed to achieve an impartial result. 
This fact was widely appreciated as the Senate bill made its way 
to the House for consideration. Just before the final vote in the 
House, Henry Payne, a Democratic leader and future member of 
the Electoral Commission,244 urged his skeptical colleagues to con-
sider the alternative: Without the statute, the Senate President 
might fill the constitutional vacuum with “a bold and unjustifiable 
usurpation.”245 Other thoughtful Democrats supported this plea. 
Here is Henry Watterson: 
I regard Tilden’s case as a good one; but I shall vote for the bill 
with the full consciousness that the action of the commission may 
bitterly disappoint me . . . . If it does, I shall still have discharged 
[my] duty in that manner which was best calculated to preserve 
constitutional forms and keep the peace of the country at a time 
241 Fairman, supra note 231, at 48–49; Willard L. King, Lincoln’s Manager: David 
Davis 290–93 (1960). 
242 Act of January 29, 1877, § 2, Ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227, 228-29 (1877). The case of single 
returns was to be handled by the two houses meeting separately, with a majority vote 
of each required to reject the return. Id. § 1. 
243 Id. § 2. 
244 Fairman, supra note 231, at 10, 47–48. 
245 44 Cong. Rec. 1050 (1877).
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when the Republic was menaced and the people were not pre-
pared for war.246
And so a bipartisan group of leaders carried off a grand act of 
constitutional statesmanship, with the House joining the Senate to 
head off the possibility of willful abuse of power by the Senate 
President. This represented a remarkable act of self-restraint on 
the Republican side.247 They had sacrificed the certainty of a Hayes 
presidency, through manipulation by the Senate President, for a 
mere possibility from the Commission. But in return, they obtained 
a greatly enhanced sense of constitutional legitimacy for the next 
President of the United States. 
Unfortunately, this triumph of statesmanship has been entirely 
lost in the fog of controversy subsequently generated by the actions 
of the Electoral Commission. The key to the entire plan was the 
appointment of Justice Davis—the only man on the Supreme 
Court with a plausible claim to political neutrality. To nearly eve-
ryone’s surprise, a Democratic-Greenback coalition in Illinois 
elected Davis to the United States Senate on January 25, just as the 
Electoral Commission bill was being enacted by Congress.248 When 
Davis resigned from the Commission to take his Senate seat, he 
was replaced by Joseph Bradley—a distinguished jurist, but one 
plainly associated with the Republican party.249 This allowed the 
Democrats to charge him with the rankest partisanship when he 
joined the seven other Commission Republicans in party-line votes 
in support of all eighteen of the Republican electors, over the 
heated dissent of the seven Commission Democrats.250
The Democrats’ cries of pain were only to be expected. It always 
hurts to lose. It remains an open—and probably unanswerable—
246 Id. at 1007. 
247 Unsurprisingly, the Republican rank and file was relatively unenthusiastic about 
ceding the power of the Senate President to a bipartisan commission. While the entire 
Senate voted 47 to 17 in favor of the bill, the Democrats supported it by a lop-sided 
margin of 26 to 1, while the Senate Republicans divided narrowly with 21 in favor and 
16 opposed. Id. at 913. Similarly, House Democrats voted 186 to 18 in favor while 
House Republicans voted against by a margin of 85 to 52, with the final count at 191 
in favor and 86 opposed. Roy Morris, Jr., Fraud of the Century: Rutherford B. Hayes, 
Samuel Tilden, and the Stolen Election of 1876, at 218 (2003).
248 Morris, supra note 247, at 217–18. 
249 Id. at 218–19. 
250 See id. at 222–25. 
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question whether Bradley in fact succumbed to political pressures. 
Despite a vigorous effort by Charles Fairman to defend Bradley’s 
integrity,251 the Commission still remains under a dark cloud in le-
gal circles.252 Whatever one makes of Bradley’s performance, it 
should not taint the statesmanship of those who created the Com-
mission as an alternative to a ruling by the Senate President. While 
Bradley’s decision was bound to be controversial, a blatantly parti-
san decision by the President Pro Tem of the Senate would have 
been far worse—inflicting grievous damage on the Hayes presi-
dency and the slow process of post-war reconciliation. 
One can only hope that similar statesmanship prevails the next 
time around, and that a new Electoral Commission is convened to 
resolve the problem. The 1877 statute, however, was a one-shot 
deal, and when Congress finally enacted a more permanent statute, 
it did not entirely eliminate the risk that the Senate President 
might once again dominate the vote-counting ritual. 
C. The 1887 Act 
Controversy over the Electoral Commission generated a decade 
of congressional debate, which finally gave rise to the Electoral 
Count Act of 1887.253 Operating once again under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, the statute shifted a great deal of the decisional 
burden from the President of the Senate to the two houses of Con-
gress. Speaking broadly, if a state submits a single return, the 
President of the Senate counts the ballot unless objections are 
raised and a majority in each house votes to reject it.254 If a state 
251 Fairman, supra note 231, at 123–58. 
252 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutional-
ism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1985, 2004 (2003) (“Although the Commission was seen by many to be com-
pletely fraudulent, the Democrats ultimately did accept its results, in exchange for an 
understanding that President Hayes would effectively end Reconstruction and would 
not run for re-election . . . .”). All of the leading books by historians echo Issacharoff’s 
comments. See Morris, supra note 247, at 222–25; Lloyd Robinson, The Stolen Elec-
tion: Hayes Versus Tilden: 1876, at 164–68 (2001); C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and 
Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (2d ed. 1966). 
253 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
254 Id. The “safe harbor” provision enacts into law a preference for picking electors 
by passing state laws governing the selection process. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). This statu-
tory provision encourages states to pass laws “prior to the day fixed for the appoint-
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submits two or more returns, the President’s job is also straight-
forward if majorities of both houses agree on the ballot that should 
be counted. Matters get murkier when the Houses disagree. In this 
case, the statute instructs the President to count the ballot certified 
by “the executive”255 of the state. But what should he do if “the ex-
ecutive” signs two or more returns? 
The statute is silent, but the problem is real—especially where 
different members of “the executive” are elected independently. 
For example, Florida’s Democratic Attorney General Robert But-
terworth strongly supported Gore,256 and Republican Secretary of 
State Katherine Harris produced opinions that notoriously favored 
Bush.257 Suppose that the United States Supreme Court had re-
mained on the sidelines and that the Florida court recount had 
given Gore’s electors a razor-thin majority. As matters became 
more heated, Governor Jeb Bush may well have decided to sign 
this second return, but even if he refused, the Florida Supreme 
Court could have authorized the Attorney General to certify the 
return and send it on to the President of the Senate. When Senate 
President Al Gore opened the ballots on vote-counting day, he 
would have found two Florida returns signed by members of the 
“executive”—one for Bush and the other for Gore. Under the 1887 
statute, each house must separately decide between the rival slates. 
ment of the electors” and discusses the more favorable treatment a state abiding by 
that rule will receive in Congress. Id. 
255 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (“But if the two Houses shall disagree in respect of the 
counting of such votes, then, and in that case, the votes of the electors whose ap-
pointment shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal 
thereof, shall be counted.”). 
256 See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, A Staunch Gore Ally Influences Florida Ballot Fight, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2000, at A27; Don Van Natta, Jr. & David Barstow, Election 
Officials Focus of Lobbying From Both Camps, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2000, at A1 (“In 
Volusia County, the only Florida county to complete a full hand recount, the state’s 
attorney general, Robert A. Butterworth, placed an unsolicited phone call a week ago 
to elections officials, advising them that they had the legal authority to go forward 
with a manual recount.”). 
257 See, e.g., David Barstow, Data Permanently Erased From Florida Computers, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2001, at A10; Richard L. Berke, 2 Sides Maneuver: Republican 
Rejects Offer That 2 Sides Accept a Count by Hand, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2000, at A1 
(“Ms. Harris . . . announced . . . that it was ‘my duty under Florida law’ to reject re-
quests from several counties to update their totals.”). 
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If they were to disagree—which was likely, but not certain258—the 
issue would have quickly returned to the President of the Senate. 
What next? 
Foreseeing this scenario, one of us signed a public statement urg-
ing Congress to follow the precedent of 1877 and create a new 
Electoral Commission.259 This should be the remedy of choice the 
next time around, but if statesmanship fails, the ghost of Thomas 
Jefferson will return to center stage and we shall all be obliged to 
conjure with the meaning of his actions on that fateful day of Feb-
ruary 11, 1801. 
Jefferson’s precedent will not be squarely on point. The future 
President of the Senate will be required to act only after the issue 
has divided the House and Senate. In contrast, Jefferson resolved 
the Georgia matter without consulting the two houses, and we can-
not know how he might have responded had one or both houses 
challenged his decision. 
Nevertheless, there can be no denying that Jefferson did more 
than “open” the Georgia ballot on that fateful day. He asserted his 
authority to decide the merits on a contestable issue. If some future 
Senate President were to claim a similar authority, he or she would 
not be wrong in pointing to Jefferson’s precedent. 
If he follows Jefferson’s lead, however, he cannot be allowed to 
go halfway. Jefferson used his power for a particular end—“to pre-
vent the phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president.”260 This should be 
the touchstone for any future President of the Senate. If he abuses 
258 On January 3, 2001, the Republicans controlled the House of Representatives by 
a margin of 223 to 211, whereas the Democrats controlled the evenly-divided Senate, 
with Gore casting the deciding vote (and Lieberman casting one of the fifty Democ-
ratic votes). See Helen Dewar & Juliet Eilperin, Divided Congress Takes Oath with 
Promises of Unity, Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 2001, at A8. It would be a mistake however, to 
assume strict party-line voting. Representatives and senators alike would have been 
swayed by prevailing sentiment in their own districts, as well as their own views on the 
merits. After all, Gore was the clear winner in the popular vote, and it is impossible to 
guess how heavily public opinion would have emphasized this point if the Supreme 
Court had not prematurely terminated the debate.
259 See Emergency Committee of Concerned Citizens 2000, The Election Crisis, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 10, 2000, at A31 (“Perhaps a bipartisan National Electoral Commission 
of the Congress and the Supreme Court will have to settle the matter, based on the 
precedent set in resolving the disputed election of 1876.”). This was signed by Profes-
sor Ackerman, among others.
260 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 16, 1797), in 16 Madison 
Papers, supra note 5, at 461, 461. 
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his authority to create a “Pseudo-president” by blatantly political 
vote counting, he would be converting Jefferson’s precedent into a 
fig-leaf for a desperate act of political usurpation. 
